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Abstract 
 
VOURI-RICHARD, DEREK, S., M.A., December 2015, Film 
A Spatial Plane of Immanence: American Cinema in Late Capitalism 
Director of Thesis: (Louis-Georges Schwartz) 
 This thesis articulates the distinct ways in which American cinema in late 
capitalism figures a plane of immanence in which space governs movement and 
dominates time. In doing so, my thesis implies a cinematic regime that differs from Gilles 
Deleuze’s two cinematic regimes of the movement-image and time-image. However, this 
body of work strives to be more than a simple extrapolation off of Deleuze’s well-known 
cinematic periods. Throughout this project I consciously venture away from the 
Deleuzian philosophy by diving into the distinct modes of production that constitute late 
capitalism, and delineating the ways in which this contemporary phase of globalization 
restructures uneven development into sectoral uneven development, a phenomenon that 
changes the ways in which bodies experience space and time on the plane of immanence. 
Thus my methodology throughout this thesis evolves and opens up a gap between 
Deleuze’s vitalism and historical materialism. In the final chapter I attempt to close this 
gap by inserting Henri Lefebvre’s spatial trialectic onto the plane of immanence. The 
contradictions between time and space that Lefebvre exposes with his spatial trialectic are 
inherent to the spatial plane of immanence of American cinema in late capitalism. 
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Introduction 
 This thesis engages with and reviews a certain body of literature that is concerned 
with space. This mysterious entity is both the primary issue under consideration in my 
analysis of the ways in which American cinema in late capitalism figures a new plane of 
immanence in which space comes to life, and it is the common concept that persists 
throughout my evolving methodology. My methodology grows throughout this body of 
work, as I consciously attempt to open up new lines of thought throughout each of the 
three chapters and bring in new critical perspectives and voices that support and develop 
my argument of a spatial rupture in the cinema. The first chapter immerses itself in Gilles 
Deleuze’s unique understanding of the cinema as a plane of bodies and affects that grows 
and changes the ways in which it figures time, space, and movement across its two 
cinematic regimes of the movement-image and time-image. Articulating the ways in 
which these pre and post World War II cinematic periods respectively figure space allows 
me to begin delineating the distinguishing spatial qualities of American cinema in late 
capitalism. In the second chapter I turn directly towards the more straightforward 
literature of historical (geographical) materialism by looking at theorists such as Fredric 
Jameson, Ernest Mandel, and Edward Soja. My primary concern here is to examine the 
ways in which changes in modes of production reshape uneven development in our 
contemporary era of late capitalism. Overall, this allows me to venture away from the 
slippery Deleuzian literature and investigate more concrete historical evidence of a 
spatial rupture in the world. In the final chapter I bring Henri Lefebvre and his spatial 
trialectic into the fold. I use Lefebvre’s, as Soja says, “objective idealism” to bridge the 
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gap between these two pillars of Deleuzian vitalism and Marxist historical materialism 
(PG 47).1 Inserting Lefebvre’s spatial trialectic onto the plane of immanence of American 
cinema in late capitalism is ultimately what my methodology builds up to. 
 Some terms and concepts need to be defined at the outset that will continuously 
reappear, be restated, more fully worked out, and redefined throughout the three chapters: 
1.) Plane of Immanence – The plane of immanence is one of the hallmarks of Deleuzian 
philosophy. It refers to an understanding of the world as that which is constituted by 
bodies existing as fluctuating and open centers of energy that are constantly changing 
through affective encounters with other fluctuating bodies (Deleuze, Spinoza 127-
128). This is an understanding of the world where affects force bodies into a perpetual 
state of becoming. The plane of immanence plays a vital role in my own methodology 
of articulating the ways in which space influences bodies and affects in American 
cinema of late capitalism 
2.) Affect – My use affect in this thesis is very exact and literal, as it comes directly from 
Deleuze’s definition of the concept in Cinema 1: “It is this combination of a reflecting, 
immobile unity and of intensive expressive movements which constitutes the affect” 
(87). Throughout the thesis I rely heavily on this definition of affect by articulating 
and understanding the full affection-image as that which contains two poles – 
reflection and intensity. 
                                                
1 In chapter two of Soja’s Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory he 
states, “In his own elaboration of the Hegel-Marx relation, Lefebvre sought to retain a strand of ‘objective 
idealism’ within the materialist dialectic, to encourage attention to contradictions in thought and 
consciousness as well as to the material bases of contradictions in concrete reality and history” (47). 
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3.) Hodological Spaces – Hodological spaces, or hodological connections, derive from 
Deleuze’s cinema books and he uses this concept to describe the kinds of spaces that 
bodies exist in and move through on the plane of immanence of the movement-image 
regime. Hodological spaces are determined and homogeneous spaces that resemble 
Euclidean qualities because they are made up of fixed dimensions and coordinates that 
outline the peripheries of the space, and sound inter-connective structures within the 
space that logically connect each of its different facets (Deleuze, C2 128). When the 
plane of immanence consists of hodological spaces bodies have little to no difficulty 
moving through space. The loss of hodological connections in American cinema of 
late capitalism is one of the most important means by which the role of space changes 
in this contemporary era of cinema. 
4.) Any-Space-Whatever – The concept of the any-space-whatever comes from Pascal 
Augé, and Deleuze uses this understanding of space in order to describe the quality of 
space in the time-image regime. The any-space-whatever is a broken spatiality, a 
world constituted by heterogeneity and fragmentation. Here there is no actual-physical 
connectivity between different facets and kinds of space (Deleuze, C1 109). In other 
words, instead of different facets of space reinforcing and associating with each other, 
we now have difference coexisting with difference. The spatiality of American cinema 
of late capitalism differs from the any-space-whatever in attaining a connective 
structure. 
5.) Sensory-Motor-Situations – Sensory-motor-situations is a Deleuzian concept that 
refers to the cohesive and linear connections between the different attributes of the 
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movement-image regime. More specifically, this refers to both the ways in which 
montage sequentially connects different frames and sets to each other, and to the ways 
in which a body’s perceptions, affections, and actions are connected in a sequential 
manner so as to foster movement, and celebrate situations of action (Deleuze, C2 xi). 
In American cinema of late capitalism this healthy state of becoming becomes 
compressed and suffocated into a much more violent state of becoming. 
6.) Optical-Sound-Situations – Optical-sound-situations is the concept that Deleuze 
uses to articulate a more disconnected and passive state of becoming on the plane of 
immanence of the time-image (C2 2). Here, the different sets and attributes of a film 
are no longer cohesive, as montage and continuity disappears and becomes replaced by 
“irrational” cutting (Deleuze, C2 xi). Along with this, the body’s perceptions, 
affections, and actions become separated from one another, and in doing so the body 
now losses the ability to react to situations. As connectivity resurfaces in American 
cinema of late capitalism so does the body’s ability to react, albeit in an unhealthy 
manner.   
7.) Sectoral Uneven Development – My definition of sectoral uneven development is 
drawn heavily from Mandel and Soja’s delineations of the ways in which capitalism 
creates geographical regions of development and geographical regions of 
underdevelopment. Sectoral uneven development is a more compressed phase of 
uneven development because it creates juxtapositions of developed and 
underdeveloped sectors within a single, homogeneous region (Mandel 103). This is the 
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shape uneven development takes in late capitalism, and as it does so it creates a more 
compressed and schizophrenic plane of immanence. 
8.) Schizophrenia – My use of schizophrenia derives from Jameson’s definition of 
schizophrenia as a break in the cognitive link between signifier and signified that 
thenceforward disrupts subjective time and creates an inability to sequentially link 
one’s own past, present, and future (Postmodernism 26-27). The compressed spatiality 
of sectoral uneven development fosters a schizophrenic state of becoming. 
9.) The Spatial Trialectic – The spatial trialectic is Lefebvre’s conceptual apparatus that 
divides social space into three layers. The first layer refers to the physical layout of 
space (Spatial practice/perceived space). The second layer refers to the use and control 
of space (Representations of space/conceived space). And the third layer refers to 
passively experiencing and living in space (Representational space/lived space) 
(Lefebvre 38-39). The culmination of and interactions between these three spatial 
layers unveils the contemporary contradictions of capitalism, and in doing so they also 
unveil the most salient contradictions of the cinematic plane of immanence of 
American cinema in late capitalism. 
 My initial critical observation for this project was that in American cinema of late 
capitalism bodies move differently than in both Deleuze’s cinematic regimes of the 
movement-image and time-image. It is a more frantic, intense, and chaotic movement. 
The kind of movement that suggests that the lived body’s relationship to the space in 
which it inhabits has changed significantly. By articulating the specific ways in which 
cinema figures this new relationship between bodies, affects, and space, and delineating 
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the historical determinates for this shift, I attempt to show that American cinema in late 
capitalism figures a plane of immanence in which space dominates bodies and affects by 
obstructing movement and pulverizing time; a spatial plane of immanence. 
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1. Venturing Beyond Movement and Time and into Intense-Searching Situations 
1.1 The Zapruder Film and an Ominous Spatiality 
 The thirty-second, single shot film of President Kennedy’s assassination falls 
outside the realms of Gilles Deleuze’s two cinematic regimes of the movement-image 
and time-image. I will begin my analysis of this distinct film by making note of Pier 
Paolo Pasolini’s essay, “Observations of the Sequence Shot,” on the short film. I bring 
this up because of the importance of Pasolini to Deleuze’s own theories on the cinema. 
For Deleuze, Pasolini’s free indirect discourse plays a vital role in his own interpretation 
of the perception-image and the time-image regime.2 My interest in Pasolini lies, 
however, outside of the realm of free indirect discourse. In fact, I’m interested in the 
ways in which Pasolini’s insights on the Zapruder film (Harris) imply a cinema beyond 
the regime of the time-image. If nothing else, I hope this connection between Deleuze’s 
use of Pasolini and my own provides some credibility as I begin to venture away from 
Deleuze’s two cinematic regimes 
 Pasolini’s interest in the Zapruder film concerns the contradictory relationship the 
film exposes between the ability to capture death, and inability to figure death through an 
absence of montage. For Pasolini, montage is equivalent to death in that both phenomena 
establish finality. Montage establishes an ending of a shot and thus makes it a complete 
thing, as death closes one’s life and creates for it a beginning and an end. Thus what is 
interesting about the Zapruder film is that it records the murder of a human being without 
using montage and therefore it figures incomplete death: “Until such living syntagmas 
                                                
2 The essay “The ‘Cinema of Poetry’” is where Pasolini works out his theory of free indirect discourse as 
applied to the cinema. 
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have been placed in a relationship among themselves, both the language of Kennedy’s 
last action and the language of the assassins are maimed, incomplete languages, 
practically incomprehensible” (Pasolini 235).  
 The notion of incomplete death presents us with something like a temporal 
rupture that may be useful for us to start moving away from Deleuze and his infatuation 
with time. In fact, I believe that the salient feature of the Zapruder film is its complete 
disinterest in time, a phenomenon that reveals itself in more ways than simply avoiding 
montage. The first half of the Zapruder film lives through the same qualities of any other 
standard movement-image film by highlighting the action-image. The short film opens 
with the bodies of cars, motorcycles, and humans sliding effortlessly through the 
determined space of the Dallas motorway. Then an external force, the bullet that strikes 
Kennedy, combats this initial action and forever changes the qualities of movements of 
the bodies. Once the bullet hits Kennedy the image experiences a rupture, as it shifts from 
one of bodies acting in and through space, to one of bodies reacting against space. This 
is, in other words, a rift in the ways in which the film figures time, space, and movement. 
 The encounter between these combating bodies, the bodies of Kennedy, his wife, 
the moving vehicles, and, on the other hand, the bullet, creates the temporal realm of 
affect. Deleuze’s two cinematic regimes differ from one another in the ways in which 
they figure this image of time, the affection-image, an image of the two poles of affect in-
itself: Reflection and intensity. Deleuze defines this interval of time in stating, “It is this 
combination of a reflecting, immobile unity and of intensive expressive movements 
which constitutes the affect” (C1 87). The time-image regime is dominated by the 
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affection-image through the any-space-whatever, as in this postwar cinematic regime 
time stunts movement and fragments space. The movement-image regime pushes the 
affection-image to a peripheral image of a close-up of the face because this prewar 
cinematic regime prioritizes the action-image. This is, in other words, a cinematic regime 
in which movement governs time and space. The Zapruder film gives us a new 
restructuration of time, space, and movement by fracturing the temporal realm of the 
affection-image into an image of pure intensity, intensity without reflection. When the 
external bullet strikes the body of Kennedy and throws his head back against his own 
will, the film does not shift into a close-up of a reflective face, as a standard movement-
image film would do. Instead, it remains entirely within the realm of the actual and 
determined spaces, shot through the combination of a long-shot and long-take. Instead of 
an image of a close-up of Mrs. Kennedy’s face absorbing the situation and contemplating 
all of the potential reactions to her husband’s mutilation, we have an image of Mrs. 
Kennedy’s body frantically scrambling out of a moving car. This is an image of pure 
intensity, an image of space dominating movement and time.  
 This new figuration of bodies and affects is, in other words, a figuration of a new 
cinematic plane of immanence, a plane of immanence that differs from the movement-
image regime’s plane of immanence and the time-image regime’s plane of immanence. 
This is a plane of immanence in which space takes control of movement and dominates 
time, and this prioritization of space is what marks the American cinema of late 
capitalism as a distinct regime of cinema. This is a cinema that, for the first time, works 
through a spatial plane of immanence. 
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1.2 What is the Plane of Immanence? 
 Besides Henri-Louis Bergson, the philosopher whom Deleuze is most indebted to 
in forming his own theories on the cinema may be Benedict De Spinoza. In both 
Deleuze’s book on Spinoza and his own books on the cinema he relies on similar 
conceptual tools to conceive of the world as a plane of immanence. With regards to his 
work on the cinema, Deleuze first uses this concept of the plane of immanence in chapter 
four of Cinema 1 to argue that the ways in which the cinema’s constituent attributes 
interact with one another goes against traditional phenomenology by avoiding a centered 
figure of natural perception. Natural perception demands a fixed subject that 
simultaneously opposes and interacts with an external object. To use Deleuze’s words, 
this is an understanding of the world that demands an “’anchoring’ of the perceiving 
subject” (C1 57). Deleuze removes cinema from the realm of phenomenology by pulling 
from Edmund Husserl and, primarily, Bergson’s theories that “all consciousness is 
consciousness of something” (Husserl), and “all consciousness is something” (Bergson) 
(C1 56). These are understandings of the world that replace the phenomenological notion 
of a centered subject with an acentered understanding of the world. Therefore 
consciousness is no longer limited to one perceiving subject. Instead, in this acentered 
universe of the cinematic image all things are conscious, which is to say that 
consciousness exists in all of the constituent parts of the cinematic image. Thus the 
essence of cinema lies in the movement, or relations, between these different conscious 
parts. The plane of immanence is exactly this understanding of the world as that which is 
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constituted by conscious parts, or attributes, and the movement between these conscious 
parts.  
 The plane of immanence as applied to the cinema refers to both the different parts 
of the cinematic image and the interactions between these parts: “The plane of 
immanence is the movement . . . which is established between the parts of each system 
and between one system and another, which crosses them all, stirs them all up together 
and subjects them all to the condition which prevents them from being absolutely closed” 
(Deleuze, C1 59). The interaction between these different parts on the plane of 
immanence of the movement-image consists of interactions that figure movement, both 
within a single frame and shot and among different shots. Together, these two kinds of 
movements create the forward progressing “open whole” of the movement-image 
(Deleuze, C1 55).3 On the plane of immanence of the time-image, on the other hand, the 
relations and interactions between the constitutive parts of the cinematic plane of 
immanence figure time. In order to more fully comprehend the difference between these 
two planes, we must first dive even deeper into the interactions between the conscious 
parts of the cinematic plane of immanence, and then define these different parts.  
 Because the plane of immanence is an acentered universe, it lives through 
encounters among its constituent bodies or parts. These encounters between bodies are 
encounters of affect and they determine the quality of actions that a body will execute 
                                                
3 In describing the two kinds of movements within the movement-image regime, Deleuze states, “Thus in a 
sense movement has two aspects. On the one hand, that which happens between objects or parts; on the 
other hand that which expresses the duration or the whole. The result is that duration, by changing 
qualitatively, is divided up in objects, and objects, by gaining depth, by losing their contours, are united in 
duration. We can therefore say that movement relates the objects of a closed system to open duration, and 
duration to the objects of the system which it forces to open up” (C1 11). 
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that results from such an encounter. This is where turning to the ways in which Deleuze 
relies on Spinoza becomes instructive towards his own cinematic plane of immanence. 
Let us begin by looking at one of Deleuze’s more telling delineations of the ways in 
which he understands Spinozist philosophy:  
In short, if we are Spinozists we will not define a thing by its form, nor by 
its organs and its functions, nor as a substance or a subject. Borrowing 
terms from the Middle Ages, or from geography, we will define it by 
longitude and latitude. A body can be anything; it can be a linguistic 
corpus, a social body, a collectivity. We call longitude of a body the set of 
relations of speed and slowness, or motion and rest, between particles that 
compose it from this point of view, that is, between unformed elements. 
We call latitude the set of affects that occupy a body at each moment, that 
is, the intensive states of an anonymous force (force for existing, capacity 
for being affected). In this way we construct the map of a body. The 
longitudes and latitudes together constitute Nature, the plane of 
immanence or consistency, which is always variable and is constantly 
being altered, composed and recomposed, by individuals and 
collectivities. (Spinoza 127-128) 
Longitude refers to the body and here Deleuze describes the body as that which is always 
in flux, or “unformed” (Spinoza 127). Earlier in this same chapter of Deleuze’s text on 
Spinoza, he shows that Spinoza’s understanding of the body has two qualities. The first is 
the “kinetic” proposition, and this is an understanding of the body as that which is defined 
  19 
   
by moving particles (123). These particles are never at rest and thus the body can never 
be understood as a form because form implies finality. The body never reaches a final 
state, or realm of stasis, because its constituent particles are constantly encountering other 
bodies on the plane of immanence. Take, for example, the different changes that the 
central character of Alfred Hitchcock’s North by Northwest undergoes throughout his 
interactions with different bodies on the film’s plane of immanence. At the beginning of 
the film the protagonist (Roger Thornhill) is a conforming, timid, and selfish advertising 
executive, but through his encounters with a mysterious lover, international spies, and the 
C.I.A. he evolves into a courageous action-hero. And herein lies the second quality of the 
body. This is the “dynamic” proposition of the body and this proposition refers to the 
body’s “capacity for affecting and being affected” (Deleuze, Spinoza 123). The capacity 
for affecting and being affected itself has two sides. These two sides are “the power of 
acting” and “the power of being acted upon” (Deleuze, Spinoza 27). Here, we can think 
of the body as that which works through two kinds of movements. The first kind is the 
movement of receiving actions and the second kind is the movement of executing 
reactions. Both of these two kinds of movements are governed by affective encounters. 
So when a body executes reactions it does so because an affective encounter with another 
body created within it the power to act. Like in Vertigo (Hitchcock) when, at the end of 
the film, the central character (Scottie) who has been suffering form vertigo throughout 
overcomes his acrophobia and forces himself and Judy to the top of the church steeple 
after he realizes that he’s been the victim of an intricate scheme of murder and fraud. 
Furthermore, to receive an action is to be in an affective encounter with another body that 
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acts upon one’s own body. When Scottie and Judy reach the top of the church’s roof she 
falls off the building and Scottie is left stunned and immobile staring down at the ground 
(Vertigo). Thus when understanding the body as that which is always fluctuating between 
reacting and being acted upon, affects are that which function as something like a pivot in 
between these two kinds of movements on the plane of immanence. To go about it 
another way, the plane of immanence consists of bodies and affects, and the pivot is 
where these two forces, one material the other immaterial, meet.4  
 When Deleuze applies this understanding of the world as that which is constituted 
by bodies and affects to the cinematic image, he translates this pivot on the plane of 
immanence as a gap or interval:  
What happens and what can happen in this acentered universe where 
everything reacts on everything else? We must not introduce a different 
factor of another nature. So what can happen is this: at any point whatever 
of the plane an interval appears – a gap between the action and reaction. 
(C1 61)  
Deleuze understands this gap as a temporal entity and he describes it as a “center of 
indetermination” that stands out among the other conscious and moving parts of the 
acentered cinematic plane of immanence (C1 62-63).5 In other words, the cinematic plane 
                                                
4 For Spinoza the plane of immanence is Nature, or God, and he describes this Nature/God as a single 
Substance which is “in itself and is conceived through itself, that is, that whose concept does not require the 
concept of another thing, from which it must be formed.” Bodies, for Spinoza, are Attributes of this single 
substance of Nature: “By attribute I understand the affections of a substance, or that which is in another 
through which it is also conceived.” Finally, Spinoza understands as affects as Modes: “By mode I 
understand the affections of a substance, or that which is in another through which it is also conceived” 
(Ethics 1).  
5 In this same section of Cinema 1 Deleuze refers to the center of indetermination as a brain in stating, 
“And the brain is nothing but this – an interval, a gap between an action and a reaction. The brain is 
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of immanence has three facets: The quality of receiving actions, the quality of executing 
reactions, and the quality of indetermination as a temporal gap that lies in between action 
and reaction. Bodies and affects, the longitudes and latitudes, are that which constitute 
these different facets. The facet of receiving actions is what Deleuze calls the perception-
image and this is an image of a looking body, whether it be the body of the camera as 
looker, or the body of a character as looker. The facet of executing reactions refers to the 
action-image and this is an image of bodies acting within the spaces that they exist in. 
Finally, the facet of indetermination is the affection-image and this is neither the image of 
a body being affected nor the image of a body affecting another body. Rather, it is an 
image of affect in-itself, which is to say time in-itself. This is the place where the 
cinematic image no longer figures the actual realm of determined spatio-temporal 
coordinates. Instead, here we leave the realm of movement and physical spatio-temporal 
coordinates and enter the virtual realm of temporality, the realm in which action is 
replaced by inaction. This is an image of coexistent pure potentialities, and its two poles 
are reflection and intensity.6 These three facets (receiving actions/perception-image, 
executing reactions/action-image, and temporal gap/affection-image) are the three facets 
of an eternal becoming that bodies live through on the cinematic plane of immanence. 
                                                                                                                                            
certainly nor a center of images from which one could begin, but itself constitutes one special image among 
others. It constitutes a center of indetermination in the acenterd universe of images” (62-63). 
6 Deleuze turns to Griffith and Eisenstein as his main exemplars of the these two sides of affect in the 
movement-image cinema: “We can already recognize in this the two types of close-up, one of which was 
the hallmark of Griffith, and the other of Eisenstein. There are famous Griffith close-ups in which 
everything is organized for the pure and soft outline of feminine face (notably the iris procedure): a young 
woman thinks about her husband in Enoch Arden. But, in Eisenstein’s The General Line, the handsome 
face of the priests is dissolved, giving way to a cheating look which links up with the narrow back of the 
head and the fleshy earlobe: it is as if the traits of faceity were escaping the outline, and testifying to the 
priest’s ressentiment” (C1 89). 
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 The affection-image is a distinct image that is separate from the realm of acting 
bodies.7 In doing so, the affection-image relies on a figuration of space that differs from 
the ways in which images of acting bodies understand and figure space. In short, in the 
affection-image time cuts apart the homogeneity and cohesiveness of space, while images 
of acting bodies figure space as cohesive so as to fosters movement. On the movement-
image’s plane of immanence, cinema figures affect by abstracting itself from bodies 
moving within determined spaces and shifting to images of the close-up of the face. 
When the cinematic image transitions to the temporal realm of a close-up of the face we 
leave behind the locale of physical spatio-temporal coordinates, locales in which bodies 
constantly move into and encounter with one another, and into to the abstract realm of 
entity: “The close-up does not tear away its object from a set of which it would form part, 
of which it would be a part, but on the contrary it abstracts it from all spatio-temporal 
coordinates, that is to say it raises it to the state of Entity” (Deleuze, C1 95-96).8  Thus, 
the movement-image’s plane of immanence consists of two kinds of images: Images of 
moving bodies in physical spatio-temporal coordinates, and images of the close-up of the 
face as abstracted from physical spatio-temporal coordinates.  
 The movement-image regime prioritizes this former image, the image of moving 
bodies, and turns the affection-image into something like a peripheral image on its plane 
                                                
7 Deluze delineates this temporal and virtual realm as distinct from the realm of movement and action in 
stating, “For we, living matter or centers of indetermination, have specialized one of our facets or certain of 
our points into receptive organs as the price of condemning them to immobility, while delegating our 
activity to organs of reaction that we have consequently liberated. In these conditions, when our 
immobilized receptive facet absorbs a movement instead of reflecting it, our activity can only respond by a 
‘tendency’, and ‘effort’ which replaces the action which becomes momentarily or locally impossible” 
(Deleuze, C1 65-66). 
8 Here is how Deleuze describes this process: “The affection-image, for its part, is abstracted from the 
spatio-temporal coordinates which would relate it to a state of things, and abstracts the face from the person 
to which it belongs in the state of things” (Deleuze, C1 97). 
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of immanence of movement. This is, in other words, another way of putting what 
Deleuze refers to as “an indirect representation” of time (C1 ix).9 In making the images of 
acting bodies the central images of its plane of immanence, determined spaces become 
the dominant spatial quality of the movement-image regime. Hodological connections 
structure these homogeneous and determined spaces and thus allow bodies to move freely 
in and among them. Deleuze associates hodological spaces with Euclidean spaces 
because these are spaces that can be conceptualized and manipulated through their fixed 
dimensions and coordinates that clearly outline the peripheries of the space, and the 
sound inter-connections within the space that logically connect all of its different facets 
(C2 128). Another way to think about this is to understand the relationship between space 
and bodies on the movement-image’s plane of immanence as Hegelian in that the finite 
and connective structures of these spaces allow bodies to rationally comprehend them and 
thenceforward use space to their own advantage. In this realm of actuality bodies exist as 
“centres of forces in space,” as opposed to the state of bodies as centers of 
indetermination within the virtual and temporal realm of the affection-image (Deleuze, 
C2 128).10 Take for example the ways in which the different groups of bodies in Fritz 
Lang’s M define the different spaces of Berlin throughout their actions in the narrative, or 
                                                
9 In the preface to Cinema 1 Deleuze states, “Their [the perception, affection, and action images]  
distribution certainly does determine a representation of time, but it must be noted that time remains the 
object of an indirect representation in so far as it depends on montage and derives from movement-images” 
(ix). 
10 Deleuze uses the phrase “centres of forces in space” and associates hodological spaces with Euclidean 
spaces when describing the kinds of narratives that use these determined spaces of the movement-image 
cinema: “This economy of narration, then, appears both in the concrete shape of the action-image and 
hodological space and in the abstract figure of the movement-image and Euclidean space. Movement and 
actions my present many obvious anomalies, breaks, insertions, superimpositions and decompositions; they 
none the less obey laws which are based on the distribution of centres of forces in space. We can say in 
general that time is the object of an indirect representation in so far as it is a consequence of action, is 
dependent on movement and is inferred from space. Hence, no matter how disordered it is, it remains in 
principle a chronological time” (C2 128). 
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the ways in which the stagecoach in John Ford’s western of the same name guides us 
through the different surfaces of western civilization: The developed and portentous city, 
the hostile and savage terrain, and the lawless slums of outlaws and prostitutes 
(Stagecoach). These are all different situations created by the actions of moving bodies.11 
Simply put, determined spaces foster the action-image.  
 When the plane of immanence of the movement-image momentarily shifts from 
an indirect representation of time to a direct representation of time by moving into a 
close-up of the face it alters the spatiality in which bodies exist. One of the ways in which 
we can understand the affection-image as a peripheral image on the movement-image’s 
plane of immanence is by turning towards the ways in which the spatiality of the 
affection-image differs from the determined spaces of the action-image. When this 
regime of cinema does briefly move into the close-up of the face, we momentarily enter a 
space that lives through different properties than the hodological spaces that foster 
movement. A close-up of the face is not a close-up of a body in a determined space. The 
close-up of the face completely abandons physical spatio-temporal coordinates by 
moving into a spatiality structured by time. In order to figure this temporal realm of 
reflection and intensity, space becomes broken by time. Cassavetes splits it, Bergman de-
individuates it, and Dreyer whites it out:  
                                                
11 When Deleuze delineates the action-image as a formula constituted by an original situation which then 
turns into a new situation because of the actions of an individual or a group (the SAS’ formula) he turns to 
Ford as an exemplar of this structure: “Throughout his work, Ford constantly grasps the evolution of a 
situation, which introduces a perfectly real time. There is certainly a great difference between the Western 
and what can be called the neo-Western; but it is not explicable in terms of a succession of genres, or a 
transition from the closed to the open in space. In Ford, the hero is not content to re-establish the 
episodically threatened order. The organization of the film, the organic representation, is not a circle, but a 
spiral where the situation of arrival differs from the situation of departure: SAS’” (C1 147).  
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In the affective film par excellence, Dreyer’s Passion of Joan of Arc, there 
is a whole historical state of things, social roles and individual or 
collective characters, real connections between them – Joan, the bishop, 
the Englishman, the judges, the kingdom, the people: in short, the trial. 
But there is something else, which is not exactly eternal or suprahistorical: 
it is what Péguy called ‘internal’. It is like two presents which ceaselessly 
intersect, one of which is endlessly arriving and the other is already 
established. . . . It is the same event but one part of it is profoundly 
realised in a state of things, whilst the other is all the more irreducible to 
all realisation.12 (Deleuze, C1 106)  
In this virtual realm of the close-up of the face, physical spatio-temporal coordinates of 
determined and hodological spaces are replaced by heterogeneous shards of space, as 
here the plane of immanence of movement momentarily shifts to a plane of immanence 
of time by figuring a fragmented, rather than cohesive, world. 
 One of the most salient differences between the movement-image’s plane of 
immanence and the time-image’s plane of immanence is that in the time-image cinema 
the temporal realm of the affection-image moves from a peripheral image to the plane’s 
central image. Towards the end of Cinema 1 Deleuze shows that the movement-image 
regime begins to crumble when the action-image falls apart and forces cinema to 
                                                
12 Deleuze’s insights on Bergman’s use of the face are also very relevant here because he points out that in 
Bergman’s cinema the face captures the state of human’s as separated from their social roles: “A character 
has abandoned his profession, renounced his social role; he is no longer able to, or no longer wants to 
communicate, is struck by an almost absolute muteness; he even looses his individuation, to the point 
where he takes on a strange resemblance to the other, a resemblance by default or by absence. Indeed, these 
functions of the face presuppose the reality of a state of things where people act and perceive. The 
affection-image makes them dissolve, disappear. We recognize one of Bergman’s scripts” (C1 99). 
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reevaluate the ways in which it works through its constitutive images of actions, 
perceptions, and affections: “The soul of the cinema demands increasing thought, even if 
thought begins by undoing the system of actions, perceptions, and affections on which 
the cinema had fed up to that point” (206). This is, in other words, a reshuffling of the 
three different facets (action-image, perception-image, and affection-image) of the plane 
of immanence. This new plane of immanence of the immediate postwar cinema is one 
that favors affects over bodies. And here, the dominant spatiality of this temporal plane of 
immanence is no longer one of determined and hodological spaces. Rather, the dominant 
spatiality becomes that which lives through fragmentation and heterogeneity, as the 
affection-image evolves and expands from being figured in close-ups of the face to 
finding a home in the any-space-whatever. The any-space-whatever is the means by 
which the time-image makes affect its central image. It is, in other words, the 
externalization of affect that changes the plane of immanence from one of being 
dominated by movement, to that which is dominated by time. In doing so, any-spaces-
whatever restructure the spaces in which bodies exist into spaces of fragmentation and 
heterogeneity. These virtual spaces, that in the movement-image’s plane of immanence 
were reserved solely to the close up of a face, now organize the milieus in which bodies 
exist on the temporal plane of immanence. Deleuze defines any-spaces-whatever as 
follows:  
Any-space-whatever is not an abstract universal, in all times, in all places. 
It is a perfectly singular space, which has merely lost its homogeneity, that 
is, the principle of its metric relations or connections of its own parts, so 
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that the linkages can be made in an infinite number of ways. It is a space 
of virtual conjunction, grasped as pure locus of the possible. What in fact 
manifests the instability, the heterogeneity, the absence of link of such a 
space, is a richness in potentials or singularities which are, as it were, prior 
conditions of all actualization, all determination. (C1 109) 
These are, in other words, spaces of time that divide the world into different splinters that 
simply coexist, instead of reinforce, with one another, and on this temporal plane of 
immanence it is no longer possible for bodies to move and act so that they can change the 
milieus in which they exist.  
 Deleuze describes the relationship between bodies and determined spaces in the 
movement-image plane of immanence as one of fostering “sensory-motor situations,” 
situations in which the body is free to move, act, and change its own milieu. Within the 
any-space-whatever a body’s relationship to space differs greatly from a body’s 
relationship to determined spaces. Deleuze describes the situations created within the 
temporal plane of immanence as “optical-sound situations,” situations in which the body 
is reduced to the state of passive seer (C2 2).13 Take, for example, the central character’s 
relationship to her own milieu in Antonioni’s Red Desert. On this temporal plane of 
immanence, Giuliana’s relationship to the other bodies on the plane of immanence is one 
of alienation. The scene within the red shack is telling. Within the shack, Giuliana is an 
impotent figure, a passive seer, because she does not accord with the other bodies in the 
                                                
13 In the first chapter of Cinema 2 Deleuze differentiates Italian Neo-Realism from the realism of the 
movement-image in stating, “What defines neo-realism is this build-up of purely optical situations (and 
sound ones, although there was no synchronized sound at the start of neo-realism), which are 
fundamentally distinct from the sensory-motor situations of the action-image in the old realism” (2). 
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shack, nor, and most importantly, with the body of the shack itself. These are two 
heterogeneous bodies, Giuliana and the shack, coexisting, rather than reinforcing, with 
each other.14 Throughout the scene Giuliana can only observe without acting. Immobile, 
she first watches the other bodies as they too struggle to move beyond the realm of 
optical-sound situation and into a sensory-motor situation (they can only talk about 
engaging in sexual intercourse). Then she looks out the window of the shack and 
becomes even more powerless when another body, the body of an industrial ship, enters 
the plane of immanence. This additional heterogeneous body further fragments the 
temporal plane of immanence. Giuliana then exits the shack only to find herself 
transfixed in the fog, yet another disconnected body. Simply put, through its constituent 
qualities of disconnection and heterogeneity the temporal plane of immanence of Red 
Desert diminishes a body’s ability to move in space, as all these different bodies, the 
body of Giuliana, the bodies of the other bourgeois characters, the bodies of the working 
class characters, the body of the shack, the ship, and the fog are all separated from one 
another on this fragmented any-space-whatever. Such an understanding of the world is a 
far cry from the determined spaces of the movement-image’s plane of immanence, spaces 
structured by hodological connections that allow the action-image to flourish. 
                                                
14 Another way of putting this is to say that here the actual and the virtual coexist with each other and 
become indiscernible. Deleuze refers to this regime as a crystalline regime: “The crystalline regime is 
completely different: the actual is cut off from its motor linkages, or the real from its legal connections, and 
the virtual, for its part, detaches itself from actualizations, starts to be valid for itself. The two modes of 
existence are now combined in a circuit where the real and the imaginary, the actual and the virtual, chase 
after each other, exchange their roles and become indiscernible” (C2 127).  
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1.3 Full Metal Jacket and the Annihilation of Movement and Time 
 I now want to venture away from the movement-image and time-image regimes 
by articulating the ways in which the spatiality of the plane of immanence of American 
cinema in late capitalism differs from the hodological spaces of the movement-image 
regime and the fragmented spaces of the time-image regime by specifically turning 
towards Kubrick’s Full Metal Jacket and, first, reading it against the preceding Kubrick 
films that Deleuze discusses in regard to the time-image regime and, then, delineating the 
ways in which it differs from the spatiality of the movement-image regime. For Deleuze, 
Kubrick uses space to create a cinema of thought. Deleuze calls this a brain cinema and 
here he points out that Kubrick’s films work through two contradictory forces, the force 
of the brain and the force of bodies. This is the way in which Kubrick’s cinema figures 
the fragmented world of coexisting temporalities that are so vital to the temporal plane of 
immanence. The heterogeneity between these different temporal structures, one brain, the 
other body, figures affect through the any-space-whatever. Deleuze’s explication is 
telling: “If we look at Kubrick’s work, we see the degree to which it is the brain which is 
mise en scène. Attitudes of the body achieve a maximum level of violence, but they 
depend on the brain” (C2 205). In other words, Kubrick’s any-spaces-whatever capture 
the two sides of affect, reflection and intensity, and in so doing they figure a world where 
bodies lack the ability to create change within the milieus they exist. Deleuze shows us 
that in Dr. Strangelove the large table in the war room is the brain which governs the 
bodies of human beings, in 2001: A Space Odyssey the brain is the giant computer, and in 
The Shining it is the Overlook Hotel (C2 205). But we can take this line of thought even 
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further to show how Kubrick uses these interactions of difference to further develop this 
temporal plane. In Thomas Allen Nelson’s detailed and instructive study of Kubrick’s 
filmic tendencies he defines the filmmakers aesthetics as a set of aesthetics that is 
concerned with the “consequences of contingency” (17), and throughout his study he 
works through the different ways in which Kubrick’s form relies on juxtapositions 
between different kinds of spaces. For example, Nelson points out that Dr. Strangelove is 
constituted by the different spaces of the war room, B-52 bomber, and the air force base 
(84). In 2001: A Space Odyssey, Nelson turns towards the different spaces of the 
interiority and enclosure of the space ships and space stations, and the exterior outer 
space, a space of expansion (120). In The Shinning he cites the differences between the 
interior realm of the hotel, and the exterior realm of the giant maze (Nelson 204-205). 
And in Paths of Glory it is the difference between the interior chateau and the exterior 
trenches (Nelson 43).15 We can carry Nelson’s analysis back to Deleuze’s any-spaces-
whatever by simply noting that these are all fragmented and heterogeneous spaces that 
coexist, rather than reinforce, with each other. In other words, these are the various ways 
in which each of these films create a temporal plane of immanence by structuring the 
world through disconnection and difference, a phenomenon that allows affect as both 
reflecting and intensive, brain and body, to flourish. 
 The plane of immanence of Full Metal Jacket, which came out seven years after 
The Shining (the latest Kubrick film that Deleuze references), relies on a very different 
                                                
15 Here Nelson states, “The first half of Paths (marked by the film’s initial fade-out, after the failed attack 
on the Ant Hill) further develops this ironic structure of oppositions and parallels between the chateau and 
the trenches, through which Kubrick will turn a system of clearly defined contrasts into a maze of 
paradoxical associations” (43). 
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world-spatial structure than Kubrick’s earlier films. Gone is the distinction between a 
body and a brain, an exterior space and an interior space. There are no more war rooms, 
haunted hotels, space ships, and chateaus that combat the external realm of bodies in 
flight. Rather than working through a coexistence of heterogeneous temporal structures, 
Full Metal Jacket places its bodies at the service of a single encompassing space. Within 
this new structure of homogeneity, bodies themselves no longer relate to their milieus 
through optical-sound situations. Instead, their relationship to these spatial milieus is one 
of intense-searching situations. 
 Full Metal Jacket is split into two narratives. In a sense it is two films, but what 
marks each of its two narratives as distinct from the temporal plane of immanence is that 
they both rely on placing bodies within a homogeneous space. In fact, we can think of the 
first narrative of Full Metal Jacket as that which works through a plane of immanence 
similar to the movement-image regime. Here the bodies of soldiers are placed within the 
determined space of the recruit-training depot. Such a space includes exterior and interior 
facets, but unlike the heterogeneity of the any-space-whatever, these are simply different 
facets of the same spatiality. They are, in other words, spaces that reinforce each other 
through hodological connections. These different facets of space are the residence hall, 
the communal bathroom, the obstacle course, the shooting range, and jogging trails. 
Although some of these spaces are more physically demanding than others, they are all 
spaces that a body can easily conceive and therefore they are spaces that foster action and 
change. Within these spaces movement flourishes as bodies evolve and exhibit their 
physical prowess: On the obstacle course bodies conquer heights by climbing over walls, 
  32 
   
on the shooting range bodies display keen precision with deadly weapons, and on the 
jogging trails bodies demonstrate their synchronized movements by marching in unison. 
These are, in short, spaces that foster sensory-motor situations.  
 The second narrative of Full Metal Jacket places its bodies within a different kind 
of homogenous space than the first narrative. This is not a homogeneous space that 
fosters sensory-motor-situations. Instead, this is a homogenous space that fosters intense-
searching situations. Once the film moves from the plane of immanence of the recruit 
depot to the plane of immanence of the chaotic Vietnam jungles, bodies shift from living 
through movements of dexterity and physical prowess to living through thoughtless 
movements of desperation and irrationality. Within the maze like structure of the 
Vietnam jungles we now enter a plane of immanence structured by a homogenous space 
that lacks hodological connections. Here bodies now lose the ability to conceive the 
milieus in which they exist. This is, in other words, the phenomenon of space coming to 
life and obstructing movement, a spatial plane of immanence. Thus the most telling 
moments of Full Metal Jacket come when bodies exist in a lost state of confused 
searching.  
 Full Metal Jacket’s climactic scene is key. A band of soldiers moving from one 
checkpoint to another in the midst of palm trees, dirt roads, demolished buildings, and 
never-ending explosions, smoke, and fire mistake their geographical coordinates and find 
themselves lost in the jungle. As the character named Eight Ball tells Cowboy (the squad 
leader) while looking over a map, “I think we’re here. And we should be here.” Upon 
realizing that they are in unknown territory the soldiers begin cautiously exploring the 
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land in order to get back on course, but are almost immediately halted by an unseen 
Vietnamese sniper who guns down one of the rooming soldier from an upper level of one 
of the standing buildings that towers over the terrain in which the soldiers are now 
reduced to scrambling animals. From here on out the soldiers have been thrown into an 
intense-searching situation. They first take cover behind a small wall of ruble. The plane 
of immanence then moves into a perception-image, an image of the soldiers searching out 
into an ominous space for that which they cannot see nor conceive. They are, in other 
words, trapped within a homogeneous space without finite coordinates and logical inter-
connections, and their actions moving forward are now actions governed by this chaotic 
and enveloping spatiality.  
 The plane of immanence of the Zapruder film throws Mrs. Kennedy into an 
intense-searching situation immediately after her husband is shot. From here on out she is 
a victim of space and reduced to climbing wildly out of a moving car. A similar process 
happens in Full Metal Jacket. Once the plane of immanence throws the bodies of the 
soldiers into intense-searching situations, they too are reduced to fleeing animals. Eight 
Ball, the soldier who was gunned down by the sniper lays in the middle of the terrain 
screaming in agony. From behind their cover, the other soldiers shoot thoughtlessly into 
the air. One soldier flees from their cover and into the terrain in an attempt to help Eight 
Ball, but he too becomes the snipers prey. More shooting and screaming ensue. Cowboy 
desperately tries to calm the situation. He yells at his men to stop shooting, “Cease fire. 
You can’t see the sniper!” This is a fleeting moment of rationality, if we can even call it 
that. The character, conveniently referred to as Animal, breaks the peace. He flees from 
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their cover and into the deadly space in which the sniper is taking aim. Here the camera 
itself also adapts to the chaotic situation by morphing into handheld and abandoning a 
stable frame. On his suicidal quest, Animal screams like a mad man while firing his rifle 
at everything in sight. From behind their cover the other soldiers resume shooting at 
nothing but space, their eternal enemy on this plane.  
 This spatial plane of immanence makes it way into other formative Vietnam War 
films. In Michael Comino’s The Deer Hunter a trio of American soldiers (Michael, Nick, 
and Steven) are forced into an intense-searching situation when they find themselves 
captured and held hostage in a cage that lies in the middle of a river within the 
encompassing spatiality of the Vietnam jungles. Here, the three soldiers are completely at 
the mercy of space as they have little to no control over their situation and lack 
understanding of their geographical location. In short, this spatial plane of immanence 
reduces the three soldiers to animal like behaviors and insane actions. Within their cages 
they are submerged in muddy water, they dwell with rats and bugs, and are forced to put 
their lives on the line on a regular basis by playing Russian Roulette. In fact, their only 
means of escape is to first give themselves completely over to space by embracing their 
savage situation and put guns to their own heads before they can turn them on their 
enemy. But once they do break free from their cages it is only fitting that they have 
nowhere to go except to simply let the river wash them down stream. On this spatial 
plane of immanence of late capitalism, these three bodies will never again be able to gain 
control over the milieus in which they exist. Michael, who before the war was the great 
deer hunter, now misfires when taking aim. The traumas of war turn Steven into an 
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invalid, and Nick losses the ability to differentiate life from death, as he spends his 
remaining postwar years gambling his life away by playing Russian Roulette. In a similar 
manner, the fanatic and renegade soldiers that exist on Apocalypse Now’s (Coppola) 
spatial plane of immanence adhere to Nick’s insanity by finding themselves in a 
perpetual situation of intense-searching, a situation which makes them lose the ability to 
differentiate war from play. 
 We are now left with asking about the place of time, the place of affect, on this 
spatial plane of immanence. For this spatial plane of immanence is not only that which 
obstructs movement, it also pulverizes time. The movement-image’s plane of immanence 
treats affect as a peripheral image by reserving it to the close-up of the face and the time-
image’s plane of immanence makes affect its primary concern by externalizing it into the 
any-space-whatever. The spatial plane of immanence, on the other hand, fractures affect. 
Let us momentarily go back to Full Metal Jacket and the ways in which it differs from 
Kubrick’s preceding time-image films. Full Metal Jacket has very little room for time 
and affect. Whereas Kubrick’s earlier time-image films cut space through time by 
structuring the world through the any-space-whatever, Full Metal Jacket performs 
something of an inverse phenomena in fracturing time through space by structuring the 
world through a homogeneous and enveloping spatiality that lacks hodological 
connections. The any-space-whatever allows Kubrick to create a plane of immanence of a 
brain and body that allows the two sides of affect, reflection and intensity, to flourish. 
Full Metal Jacket, on the other hand relies on a plane of immanence without a brain, a 
plane of immanence that fractures time into affection-images of pure intensity. This is 
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affect without reflection, time dominated by space. On the spatial plane of immanence 
cinema no longer figures affect as a virtual moment of thought. There is no more room 
for thought. Affect has been pulverized into intensity and violence, animal-like 
movements that come at the expense of the totality of space. This is the image of a 
flailing body scrambling out of a moving car (The Zapruder film), the image of a mad 
soldier firing a rifle at everything in sight as he runs across a hostile terrain (Full Metal 
Jacket), the image of a prisoner screaming while he puts a loaded gun to his own head 
and pulls the trigger (The Deer Hunter), and the image of fanatic soldiers surfing off the 
Vietnam coasts in the midst of battle (Apocalypse Now).  
 In a world of homogeneity without hodological connections, space swallows time. 
The connections that constitute this homogenous spatiality are not only that which 
prevent bodies from conceiving their situations, they are also that which fosters violence 
and intensity. The spatial plane of immanence is a homogenous world constituted by 
contradictory connections. 
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2. Searching Through Sectoral Uneven Development 
2.1 From Disconnection to Contradiction 
 Throughout his formulation of the cinema as that which grows from one regime to 
another, Gilles Deleuze resists making strong connections between cinema’s own 
evolution and the rifts and evolution of twenty-first century capitalism. The most explicit 
acknowledgement that Deleuze makes between the ruptures inherent to cinema and the 
world in which it exists is to World War II. For Deleuze, the war functions as a break in 
between the movement-image and time-image regimes because of the various ways in 
which the war physically restructured the world, a phenomenon marked by deserted 
regions, abandoned buildings, and demolished cities (C2 xi).16 These are some of the 
constituent features of the time-image cinema’s any-spaces-whatever, spaces cut apart by 
time and affect that structure the world through fragmentation, heterogeneity, 
disconnection, and emptiness. While discussing the any-space-whatever in Cinema 1, 
Deleuze is forward enough to cite the war as an influence for the prevalence of any-
spaces-whatever in the postwar cinema:  
…after the war, a proliferation of such spaces [any-spaces-whatever] 
could be seen both in film sets and in exteriors, under various influences. 
The first, independent of the cinema, was the post-war situation with its 
towns demolished or being reconstructed, its waste grounds, its shanty 
                                                
16 In his preface to Cinema 2, Deleuze delineates the ways in which World War II functions as a break in 
cinema’s evolution in stating, “Why is the Second World War taken as a break? The fact is that, in Europe, 
the post-war period has greatly increased the situations which we no longer know how to react to, in spaces 
which we no longer know how to describe. These were ‘any spaces whatever’, deserted but inhabited, 
disused warehouses, waste ground, cities in the course of demolition or reconstruction. And in these any-
spaces-whatever a new race of characters was stirring, a kind of mutant: they saw rather than acted, they 
were seers” (xi). 
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towns, and even in places where the war had not penetrated, its 
undifferentiated urban tissue, its vast unused places, docks, warehouses, 
heaps of girders and scrap iron. (120) 
On this temporal plane of immanence the affection-image trumps the action-image as 
optical-sound situations replace sensory-motor situations, and fragmented spaces of 
temporality replace hodological spaces of movement. Hodological spaces are determined 
and homogeneous spaces that resemble Euclidean spaces because they are made up of 
fixed dimensions and coordinates that outline the peripheries of the space, and sound 
inter-connective structures within the space that logically connect each of its different 
facets. 17 These spaces constitute the plane of immanence of the movement-image regime 
and figure a cohesive world where bodies can logically conceive and change the milieus 
in which they exist. To go about it another way, on the plane of immanence of the 
movement-image bodies exist as “centres of forces” within a cohesive world constituted 
by actual and hodological spaces, a world in which the action-image flourishes (Deleuze, 
C2 128). The time-image’s plane of immanence, on the other hand, places bodies within 
a broken world of heterogeneous spaces and virtual connections, a world where the 
affection-image flourishes and bodies existing as “centers of indetermination” are 
                                                
17 Deleuze associates hodological spaces with Euclidean spaces when describing the kinds of narratives that 
use these determined spaces of the movement-image cinema: “This economy of narration, then, appears 
both in the concrete shape of the action-image and hodological space and in the abstract figure of the 
movement-image and Euclidean space. Movement and actions my present many obvious anomalies, 
breaks, insertions, superimpositions and decompositions; they none the less obey laws which are based on 
the distribution of centres of forces in space. We can say in general that time is the object of an indirect 
representation in so far as it is a consequence of action, is dependent on movement and is inferred from 
space. Hence, no matter how disordered it is, it remains in principle a chronological time” (C2 128). Also, 
refer to pages ten and eleven of chapter one of my thesis for a  
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reduced to passive seers (Deleuze, C1 62-63).18 This is the difference between The Ringo 
Kid’s heroics on the movement-image’s plane of immanence of Stagecoach (Ford) and 
Giuliana’s impotence on the temporal plane of immanence of Red Desert (Antonioni).  
 So for Deleuze one of the salient differences between a cinema just before and 
just after the war, concerns the various implications of a world structure that moves from 
cohesion to fragmentation after the Second World War. This is a shift that forces cinema 
to restructure the ways in which it figures and refigures time, space, and movement in its 
attempt to understand the world in which it exist. I believe that, today, late capitalism and 
globalization have restructured the world in such a dramatic way that cinema has been 
forced to again reevaluate the ways in which it understands the interactions between time, 
space, and movement. To put it another way, I believe that with late capitalism it is no 
longer possible to overlook the rifts inherent to capitalism’s growth as a significant 
contributing cause to the growth of cinema, the kind of cause that World War II played in 
the shift from a plane of immanence of movement to a plane of immanence of time. This 
is so because late capitalism physically restructures the world in such a way that the 
fragmented and disconnected world of the time-image’s any-spaces-whatever become 
replaced by a world of contradictory connections. Contradictory connections refer to a 
spatiality in which opposing kinds of geographical regions reinforce each other through a 
connective structure of contradiction. On this spatiality complete heterogeneity 
                                                
18 In Cinema 1 Deleuze refers to the temporal realm of the center of indetermination as a brain in stating, 
“And the brain is nothing but this – an interval, a gap between an action and a reaction. The brain is 
certainly nor a center of images from which one could begin, but itself constitutes one special image among 
others. It constitutes a center of indetermination in the acenterd universe of images” (62-63). 
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disappears as, here, certain regions prosper exactly because other regions suffer. This is 
the homogeneous and contradictory world of uneven development.  
 It goes without saying that uneven development existed in both the regimes of the 
movement-image and time-image, and therefore one could simply discredit the 
significance that I am placing on uneven development as a determination for a new 
cinematic plane of immanence. But to do so would be to overlook the salience of the 
specific shape and quality that uneven development takes in late capitalism, an 
organizational structure that differs greatly from the kinds of uneven development that 
existed in the regimes of the movement-image and time-image. Throughout the rest of 
this chapter I will, first, turn primarily towards Ernest Mandel and Edward Soja’s work 
on late capitalism, space, and uneven development in order to delineate the ways in 
which uneven development in late capitalism differs from the previous phases of uneven 
development that came before it. Through this discussion I then hope to show that 
specific shape and quality of uneven development in late capitalism, sectoral uneven 
development, gives more life to space. And cinema understands this phenomenon by 
figuring a plane of immanence in which space obstructs movement and pulverizes time. 
The intense and contradictory connections of sectoral uneven development throws bodies 
into intense-searching situations on a schizophrenic plane of immanence that is ripe with 
violence, perplexity, and contingency.  
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2.2 “Sectoral Uneven Development” and a Release of Intensity and Schizophrenia 
 It is imperative that we first define sectoral uneven development, as working 
through its different features we will allow us to gain a better understanding of the ways 
in which the plane of immanence of late capitalism is a plane of immanence in which 
space comes to life and becomes a more arduous and taxing entity. The history of 
capitalism is the history of overcoming its inherent contradictions. After World War II 
and the immediate postwar era, an event that David Harvey describes as “the greatest 
event in capitalism’s history of creative destruction” (18), capitalism found itself yet 
again restructuring the world so as to maintain its own existence. This period of creative 
destruction, however, was not one marked by massive demolition, ruin, and 
fragmentation. Rather, the period of restructuration that gave birth to late capitalism was 
marked by technological innovations, centralization on a global scale, and more flexible 
organizational structures that dramatically reshaped uneven development and redefined 
national borders. In turning to Fredric Jameson we can use 1973 as a simple marker for 
when this period began taking shape in a concrete way:  
…the economic system and the cultural . . . somehow crystallized in the 
great shock of the crises of 1973 (the oil crisis, the end of the international 
gold standard, for all intents and purposes the end of the great wave of 
‘wars of national liberation’ and the beginning of the end of traditional 
communism), which now that the dust clouds have rolled away, disclose 
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the existence, already in place, of a strange new landscape… 
(Postmodernism, xx-xxi).19  
From here alone we can get a sense of the fragmentation of the immediate postwar era 
disappearing and being replaced by something new.  
 In order to understand this new world structure that late capitalism creates we 
must dive even deeper into the specific causes of this period of restructuration and its 
implications, all of which will, I hope so, point us towards an understanding of space as 
becoming a more ominous and convoluted force than ever before. Soja describes 
restructuring as that which “conveys the notion of a ‘break’, if not a break, in secular 
trends, and a shift towards a significantly different order and configuration of social, 
economic, and political life. It thus evokes a sequential combination of falling apart and 
building up again…” (PG 159).20 What Soja calls restructuring, Harvey calls ‘time-space 
compression’: “I mean to signal by that term processes that so revolutionize the objective 
qualities of space and time that we are forced to alter, sometimes in quite radical ways, 
how we represent the world to ourselves” (240). Whatever term we decide to use it is 
                                                
19 This comes from Jameson’s Postmodernism text in which for him the concept of postmodernism refers to 
cultural rifts that are determined by the economic shifts of late capitalism: “…the expression late capitalism 
carries the other, cultural half of my title within it as well; not only is it something like a literal translation 
of the other expression, postmodernism, its temporal index seems already to direct attention to changes in 
the quotidian and on the cultural level as such” (xxi). There was a point in this thesis where I considered 
using the term postmodernism instead of late capitalism, but I ultimately chose to go with the latter term in 
an attempt to avoid the ongoing confusion that still persist around the term postmodernism. My 
interpretation of postmodernism is very much in line with Jameson in that I understand postmodernism as 
simply the cultural symptoms of late capitalism.  
20 Here is the full definition that Soja provides for Restructuring: “Restructuring in its broadest sense, 
conveys the notion of a ‘break’, if not a break, in secular trends, and a shift towards a significantly different 
order and configuration of social, economic, and political life. It thus evokes a sequential combination of 
falling apart and building up again, deconstruction and attempted reconstitution, arising from certain 
incapacities or peturbations in established systems of thought and action. The old order is sufficiently 
strained to preclude conventional pathwork adapatation and to demand significant structural change 
instead. Extending Gidden’s terminology, one can describe this break-and-shift as a time-space 
restructuration of social practices from the mundane to the mondiale” (159). 
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important to keep in mind that these changes of the ways in which we experience time 
and space on the plane of immanence stem from the inherent contradictions of capitalism 
that force capitalism into periods of crisis in which it must overcome overaccumulation in 
order to produce surplus-profit.21 Now, what marks late capitalism as distinct from the 
phases of capitalism that come before it concerns the specific ways in which it exploits 
labour in order to adapt to the contradictions of capitalism, and the physical-geographical 
implications of this process. In Mandel’s seminal text, Late Capitalism, he shows that 
that throughout the history of capitalism the specific ways in which capitalism exploits 
labour creates a distinct geographical body or form.22 These different forms are spatial 
relationships between geographically developed and underdeveloped regions. In other 
words, the natural process of accumulation of capital itself creates geographical regions 
of development and geographical regions of underdevelopment so as to foster labour 
exploitation which creates accumulation. Soja, in reference to Costis Hadjumichalis, 
describes the relationship between uneven development and the creation of surplus-profit, 
as the “geographical transfer of value” and he neatly sums up this process in stating:  
In all of these forms of geographical value transfer [uneven development], 
the basic pattern is the same whether it is described as part of the 
                                                
21 Harvey defines overaccumulation as “a condition in which idle capital and idle labour supply could exist 
side by side with no apparent way to bring these idle resources together to accomplish socially useful tasks” 
(180). 
22 In addition to delineating the ways in which uneven development allows capitalism to overcome its 
inherent contradictions, Mandel provides an instructive summary of the Marxist theory of value by showing 
that capitalism has no inherent limit to its existence because it lives through the transfer of value which is 
created by a difference in the number of hours a laborer works and the number of hours the laborer is paid 
to work: “The Marxist theory of value starts out from the axiom that the total mass of surplus-value is equal 
to the total mass of social surplus labour, or in other words is determined by the total number of manhours 
worked less the total amount of necessary labour” (100). In other words, capitalism creates surplus-value 
through exploiting the labourer by reducing his or her wages through extending the amount of hours 
worked (absolute surplus value) or intensifying the amount of labour that takes place within the working 
day (relative surplus value). 
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centralization and concentration of capital or the domination of core over 
periphery. A portion of surplus product generated at one location is 
blocked from being locally realized and accumulated, while the surplus 
produced at another location is augmented. (PG 115) 
The geographical transfer of value is, in other words, the way in which different 
socioeconomic spaces contradict with, but also reinforce each other, a spatiality that is 
simultaneously homogeneous and contradictory.  
 Throughout the history of capitalism Mandel identifies three different phases of 
uneven development, or three different geographical bodies of capitalism, and points out 
that the main difference between the developed and underdeveloped regions concerns the 
amount of surplus-profit that is locally realized and accumulated within that region. The 
differing amount of surplus-profit that is locally realized in the developed and 
underdeveloped regions is determined by two factors: (1) the specific kinds of products 
that are produced, and (2) the means by which products are produced. Mandel shows us 
that this first difference, the difference between the kinds of products produced, creates 
the first two phases of uneven development. Here the principal difference between the 
two contrasting but codependent regions is a difference between agricultural production 
of raw materials and industrial production of finished goods. In the first phase of uneven 
development the differing geographical regions are that of the city and that of the 
countryside. In the second phase of uneven development the distinction between 
agricultural production and industrial production evolves beyond the local distinction of 
city and countryside and morphs into the contradictory relationship between imperialist 
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nations and colonized nations (Mandel 75-107).23 It is somewhere within this second 
stage of uneven development where cinema turns to the any-space-whatever in order to 
figure a heterogeneous and fragmented world. Within this period of uneven development 
the division between developed and underdeveloped spheres are physically farther apart 
than ever before in the historical process of capitalism. Add to this the destructive and 
reconstructive nature of the Second World War itself and the simple fact that capitalism 
had yet to acquire a global reach, and we can see why the plane of immanence of the 
time-image is a plane of immanence of disconnection. All of this changes in the third 
phase of uneven development, the phase that brings about late capitalism. Here, uneven 
development no longer stems from a difference between the kinds of products that are 
produced (raw materials v. finished goods). Instead, the forces that create uneven 
development today directly refer to the means by which a product is produced. To put it 
another way, technological innovations in production plays a more active role in shaping 
uneven development in late capitalism, a phenomenon that can only come about once 
capitalism attains its global reach. 
 With globalization comes centralization, one of the most important innovations of 
late capitalism and the ways in which it structures its unique period of uneven 
development. Centralization refers to the growing concentration and organization of 
collective labour, mass production, and reproduction into individual centers of 
accumulation (corporations). This process reaches its most mature form in globalization 
where a unified world market opens the floodgates for credit and competition, “the two 
                                                
23 In my own discussion of uneven development throughout this entire section of my chapter I am relying 
primarily on Mandel’s chapter titled “The Three Main Sources of Surplus Profit in the Development of 
Modern Capitalism” from his text Late Capitalism. 
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most powerful levers of centralization” (Marx 779).24 These two facets of centralization, 
credit and competition, become two of the most influential means by which capitalism 
accumulates surplus-value and structures uneven development in late capitalism.  
 The role of credit in late capitalism is anything but straightforward, as it 
contributes a great deal to turning this historical era into one marked by schizophrenia 
and uncertainty. Harvery describes the financial system under the current world market as 
that which as grown so complex that it surpasses common understanding (161). This is so 
because our present financial system depends greatly on fictitious capital, or future 
investments. Harvey defines fictitious capital as “capital that has a nominal money value 
and paper existence, but which at a given moment in time has no backing in terms of real 
productive activity or physical assets as collateral” (182). In late capitalism’s global 
market, future investments come from areas across the entire globe and apply to 
corporations all over the world. Again, Harvey points us to an instructive summary:  
‘Banking,’ said the Financial Times (8 May 1987), ‘is rapidly becoming 
indifferent to the constraints of time, place and currency.’ It is now the 
case that ‘an English buyer can get a Japanese mortgage, an American can 
tap his New York Bank account through a cash machine in Hong Kong 
and a Japanese investor can buy shares in a London-based Scandinavian 
bank whose stock is denominated in sterling, dollars, Deutsche Marks and 
Swiss francs.’ (161) 
                                                
24 Marx describes the effects of centralization in stating, “Everywhere the increased scale for industrial 
establishments is the starting-point for a more comprehensive organization of the collective labour of many 
people, for a broader development of their material motive forces, i.e. for the progresses transformation of 
isolated processes of production, carried on by customary methods into socially combined and scientifically 
arranged processes of production” (780).  
  47 
   
The world of late capitalism has replaced fragmentation with a homogeneous spatiality in 
which places exist without roots and the connections between the different facets of space 
are incomprehensible. 
 With regards to competition, this is where we can more directly see the effects 
that late capitalism’s emphasis on the means of production has on this new plane of 
immanence of space. Emphasis on the means of production refers to innovations in 
production that increases the amount of productivity that occurs in the working day. Such 
a process primarily comes in the form of technological innovations. Technological 
innovations refer both to highly developed machines that replace older industrial 
machines, and more efficient organizational structures.25 This process has many features 
that move beyond the specific locus of production. In additional to technological and 
organizational innovations giving us robots of all sorts, it also fosters fragmented and 
migratory employment that comes in the form of “part-time, temporary or sub-contracted 
work arrangements” (Harvey 150), a greater emphasis on information and instant data 
analysis that reveals consumer trends and demands, an increased level of consumption of 
products with reduced half-lives, and a “proportionate surge in service employment” that 
is needed to keep pace with the high level of consumption (Harvey 156-159).26 Because 
                                                
25 Soja’s summary of the importance of technological rents in late-capitalism is instructive: “As he 
[Mandel] is careful to note, these technological rents – profits originating from advances in productivity 
based largely on technological developments and the organization of production systems – existed in earlier 
periods and were essential to the very origins of capitalism. In the absence of high levels of centralization 
and concentration of capital, however, the appropriation of technological rents tended to be limited in 
magnitude and of short duration, especially given uncontrolled entrepreneurial competition. Only with late 
capitalism, he argues, do they become predominant and efficiently systemic” (167). 
26 Soja conveniently lays out eight trends of late capitalism’s restructuring period that first made themselves 
apparent in the 1980s: 
1.) Segmented, flexible, and subcontracting production within centralization;  
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we have slightly ventured away from the specific shackles of production, it is crucial to 
remind ourselves that these various facets of competition’s role in late capitalism stem 
from surplus-profit being extracted from changes in the means of production. Never 
before has capitalism been more obsessed with innovations in labour than in our 
contemporary era of centralization. It is as if once capitalism extended its reach across the 
entire globe its relationship to space changes from one of conquering the lifeless and 
dominated quality of space to one of turning space into that which compresses and 
suffocates movement and time through intensified competition, and the schizophrenic 
nature of fictitious capital. 
 This third phase of uneven development, sectoral uneven development, creates a 
spatiality of intensity and schizophrenia. I rely heavily on these two terms, intensity and 
schizophrenia, throughout this chapter because I believe they serve as a useful bridge in 
between the structure of late capitalism’s sectoral uneven development, and the ways in 
which cinema figures this new condition of becoming in the world. I understand and 
define intensity as a level of extremity that prevents one from moving beyond the realm 
of the immediate. So intense labour is labour that can only be done through extreme focus 
on nothing but the task at hand. Intense actions are extreme actions that are absent of 
                                                                                                                                            
2.) “Technology-based integration of diversified industrial, research, and service activities that 
similarly reallocates capital and labour into sprawling spatial systems of production linking 
centers of administrative power over capital investment to a constellation of parallel branches, 
subsidiaries, subcontracting firms, and specialized public and private services:” 
3.) Global finance capital;  
4.) The end of state-managed capital and the creation of “footloose and mobile capital;” 
5.) “Intensified territorial competition among government units;” 
6.) “Reindustrialization based primarily on advanced technologies of production and centered on less-
unionized sectors;”  
7.) Deeper fragmentation and “more pronounced polarization” between high pay, high skill jobs and 
low pay, low skill jobs; 
8.) Job growth occurs among weekly organized and “easily manipulated labour pools” (184-187).       
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sufficient comprehension of the situation. An intense spatiality, then, refers to a spatial 
structure that is so trying and complex that it disrupts comprehension and becoming, and 
therefore encourages bodies to live through extreme actions of thoughtlessness. In my use 
of schizophrenia I am drawing heavily from Jameson’s definition of the concept as a 
break in the cognitive link between signifier and signified that thenceforward disrupts 
subjective time and creates an inability to sequentially link one’s own past, present, and 
future, a process that then creates coexisting presents and intense affects:  
This present of the world or material signifier comes before the subject 
with heightened intensity, bearing a mysterious charge of affect, here 
described in the negative terms of anxiety and loss of reality, but which 
one could just as well imagine in the positive terms of euphoria, a high, an 
intoxicatory or hallucinogenic intensity.27 (Postmodernism 27-28) 
Thus, a schizophrenic spatiality is a spatiality that attacks time and becoming through 
intensity. This is, in my opinion, a fitting description of late capitalism’s sectoral uneven 
development because of its strong reliance on the schizophrenia of credit, that which 
breaks the linear links between the present and future, and intense competition (and 
intense labour) that demands extreme actions in order to keep pace with the rapid-fire 
changing nature of investments and innovations in production. The previous two phases 
of uneven development depended heavily on differences in the kinds of products 
produced (finished goods v. agriculture), and as a result distinctions in regions (city v. 
countryside) and national borders (first world v. third world) functioned as important 
                                                
27 I should also note here that Jameson’s definition of schizophrenia derives from Jacques Lacan and his 
conception of the signifying chain (Postmodernism 26-27). 
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barriers and markers to conceptualizing the spatiality of these historical eras. However, 
because extraction of surplus-profit in late capitalism depends more on innovations in 
labour, this intense and schizophrenic spatiality replaces a spatiality of finite regional and 
national borders. This is, in other words, a shift from Euclidean and hodological spaces to 
the homogeneous and contradictory spaces of sectoral uneven development.  
 Sectoral uneven development refers to juxtapositions of developed and 
underdeveloped sectors within a homogeneous region (Mandel 103). I want to start 
delineating this phenomenon by pointing towards the role and physical make up of major 
centers of accumulation and development in late capitalism. Broadly speaking, here I am 
referring to the process of decentralization and recentralization that reflects “both the 
internationalization of the urban space economy and the composite technological and 
organizational changes that have marked the rise of flexible specializations in the 
production of goods and services” (Soja, PG 209).28 These changing major centers of 
accumulation are, in other words, where we can most emphatically see the ways in which 
intensified competition and schizophrenic credit within centralization break down 
regional and national borders. Decentralization refers to the “rise of the outer city” or 
“peripheral urbanization” (Soja, PG 209 and 212). This is the process of growth sectors 
of accumulation sprouting up outside the boundaries of traditional metropolitan cores, 
and it is a direct influence of intensified competition. As technological innovation gives 
production a more flexible nature, it is now relatively easy for corporations to respond to 
intensified competition by expanding production into what once were unknown 
                                                
28 Soja’s quote here is in reference towards Michael Storper and Susan Christopherson’s “Flexible 
Specialization and Regional Industrial Agglomerations.” 
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territories. Perhaps the most prominent example of this process of production finding a 
new home in late capitalism concerns Asia’s shift from a former Third World economy 
and nation to one of the premiere sites of production and manufacturing in the 1980s 
(Jameson, Valences 581).29 Recentralization, on the other hand, refers to the “downtown 
renaissance” (Soja, PG 209), and this phenomenon is more directly related to 
schizophrenic nature of fictitious capital in a world market. Late capitalism has seen a 
massive regrowth in many large metropolitan areas, a phenomenon that is rarely without 
support from foreign capital. Soja’s description of Los Angeles’ funding in this historical 
era is telling:  
More than half the prime properties in downtown Los Angeles is now 
owned by foreign corporations or by partnerships with foreign companies, 
led by Japan and Canada; and foreign capital is said to have financed as 
much as 90 percent of recent multistory building construction. Perhaps 
only in New York City has there been such a massive urban shopping 
spree by international capital in so short a time and from so many different 
sources. (PG 215) 
                                                
29 Here Jameson turns to Giovanni Arrighi to not only illustrate the ways in which Asia moves out of the 
Third World in late capitalism, but also the socioeconomic implications that this shift has on turning Africa 
into an “undevelopable” region: “In a remarkable historical analysis, Giovanni Arrighi has pinpointed the 
historical moment in which the former Third World began to separate into the industrial ‘miracles’ of the 
Asian tigers (Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and now China itself), and regions once no less ‘underdeveloped’ 
than they were, such as Africa, but which have now, particularly in their light, come to seem essentially 
undevelopable. This moment is of course the moment of the full-blown emergence of late capitalism (or 
globalization, or postmodernity), namely the Thatcher/Reagan moment of the early 1980s, in which ‘the 
United States, which in the 1950s and 1960s had become the major source of world liquidity and of direct 
investment, in the 1980s became the world’s main debtor nation and by far the largest recipient of foreign 
capital” (Valences 581). 
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 On the surface, such rapid growth is certainly impressive and the capitalists will 
never shy away from proclaiming their progress. We must, however, remind ourselves 
that capitalism cannot grow without labour exploitation, which includes complete 
unemployment. Coexisting among these sectors of development caused by 
internationalization and technological innovations are large pools of the industrial reserve 
army: unemployed blue-collar workers, large amounts of homeless people, growing 
streams of immigration, and neighborhoods of ethnic and racial minorities. The resulting 
structure is one of deep polarization between high skill, high pay jobs, and low skill, low 
pay jobs, along with unemployment existing within the same geographical regions. To 
provide a concrete example of this sectoral structure of uneven development we can 
again turn to one of Soja’s descriptions of the rising number of immigrants in Los 
Angeles:  
…the contemporary restructuring period of the Los Angeles region has 
many characteristics of a restoration, an attempted reestablishment and 
refurbishing of a system of labour relations which had proved successful 
in the past. In this round of restructuring, however, the reserve army of 
minority and migrant workers (augmented by a massive entry of women 
into the workforce) has grown to unprecedented levels, creating an 
overflowing pool of cheap, relatively docile labour that is not only locally 
competitive but also able to compete with the new industrial 
concentrations of the Third World. (PG 216 – 217) 
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In other words, inherent to sectoral uneven development is a perpetual struggle between 
international and technologically savvy capital, and a hindered working class: “The 
labour movement, with a few exceptions, remains in a Fordist mode fighting against an 
enemy that has become too slippery and diffuse to negotiate within traditional ways” 
(Soja, PG 219).  
 Lastly, it is important to point out that this new phase of uneven development 
does not eliminate the previous phases of uneven development that came before it 
(Mandel 107).30 Exploitation of agricultural regions and exploitation of less developed 
nations are two processes crucial to capitalism’s growth. What ultimately makes late 
capitalism such a distinct historical phase is that it throws this discombobulated spatial 
layer of sectoral uneven development over the more finite and determined spatial layers 
of regional uneven development and international uneven development. And in doing so 
it, for the first time, changes the function of space on the plane of immanence from a 
passive force to an active and dominating force. Space has come to life, it is malleable, it 
is chopped up and at the same time held together, it has been torn from its historical 
roots: “Never before has the spatiality of the industrial capitalist city or the mosaic of 
uneven regional development become so kaleidoscopic, so loosened from its nineteenth-
century moorings, so filled with unsettling contrariety” (Soja, PG 187). And it has 
reacted to this process in the most aggressive and violent manner by becoming intense 
and schizophrenic spaces, spaces that attack bodies and affects, movement and time. The 
                                                
30 Here is how Mandel summarizes the point that I am trying to make: “It must constantly be borne in mind 
that the exploitation of agricultural regions, the exploitation of colonies and semi-colonies and the 
exploitation of technologically less developed branches of production, do not merely follow each other in 
succession as the main sources of surplus-profit, but that they also co-exist side by side in each of the three 
phases of the capitalist mode of production” (107).	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world put itself back together after the direct postwar period and moved on from the 
shards of the any-spaces-whatever, but in doing so it created a world of violent 
contradictions, a plane of immanence in which space allows intensity to reign free.  
 
2.3 Blade Runner as a Film that Throws Bodies into the Chaos 
 We can turn to Los Angeles, where it “all comes together” (Soja, PG 190). As 
touched on above, Los Angeles is something of a seminal marker of late capitalism’s 
kaleidoscopic uneven development. The city is the locus of an ever expanding 
technocracy, accelerated finance capital, American government and military structures, 
one of the largest American regions of foreign capital, along with massive flows of 
immigration, unemployment, dilapidated and densely populated minority neighborhoods, 
and the largest concentration of homeless people in the country (Soja, PG 208-217). A 
brief comment on the historical growth of Los Angeles provides a clear conception of the 
shift in capitalism’s growth towards sectoral uneven development and extracting surplus-
value through innovations in the means of production. Beginning in the 1920s, 
agriculture and oil, the production of raw materials, were Los Angeles’ first sources of 
accumulation. By the 1930s, Los Angeles had become industrialized and extracted more 
surplus-profit through manufacturing (Soja, PG 191). Today, however, a large portion of 
the city’s accumulation comes from technology firms (Soja, PG 210).31 We can think of 
Blade Runner (Scott) as the logical extension of this historical trajectory of extracting 
surplus-profit through placing more and more emphasis on technological innovation. For 
                                                
31 Soja gives us a concise summary of Los Angeles’ growth in stating, “Since 1900, there may be no other 
place where the upheavals associated with capitalist centralization have developed more rapidly or 
shamelessly” (190-191).	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within the film’s futuristic diegetic Los Angeles, giant corporations use human-like 
robots, or “replicants,” as their means of production. The fictitious giant corporation that 
owns and exploits these replicants is the powerful Tyrell Corporation, located somewhere 
around downtown Los Angeles. The film’s plot centers on a handful of the Tyrell 
replicants who go on a mission of rebellion and vengeance against their creators by 
leaving the off world colonies in which they work in order to return to earth, more 
specifically Los Angeles, so that they can meet their makers and expand their lifespan. In 
doing so the plot becomes a narrative of searching and twisting through the various facets 
of a postindustrial Los Angeles. For also on the other end of the narrative spectrum we 
have Rick Deckard, the reluctant Blade Runner (police officer) whom has been forced to 
find the rogue replicants and “retire” (code for kill) them. Thus we have two different 
parties, one replicants and the other Deckard, each existing, which is to say searching, on 
the spatial plane of immanence of a Los Angeles constituted by the kaleidoscopic nature 
of sectoral uneven development. 
 Before jumping into my own analysis of the ways in which Blade Runner figures 
a spatial plane of immanence I first want to spend some time working through some of 
the ways in which the film has previously been discussed in relationship to late capitalism 
because I believe that buried within these other texts lie an understanding of the film as 
that which uses space to attack movement and time. Blade Runner has becomes 
something of a seminal marker for cinema’s relationship to late capitalism, as it has been 
written on extensively both within and beyond the field of film studies for the ways in 
which it emphatically represents and captures the most popular themes of this new phase 
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of capitalism (which in the following articles many of the authors refer to as 
postmodernism instead of late capitalism). Giuliana Bruno’s instructive article, fittingly 
titled “Ramble City: Postmodernism and ‘Blade Runner’” is heavily indebted to 
Jameson’s interpretation of postmodernism, as throughout she delineates the ways in 
which the film accentuates the most prominent postmodern symptoms such as pastiche, 
schizophrenia, and the simulacra and simulation. In Wong Kin Yuen’s article “On the 
edge of Spaces: “Blade Runner’, ‘Ghost in the Shell’, and Hong Kong’s Cityscape” he 
relates the science fiction film to the architecture and spatiality of Hong Kong’s 
urbanscape in the late 1990s and early 2000s in order to delineate the tendencies of 
multiculturalism in postmodernity (21). In Timothy Yu’s “Oriental Cities, Postmodern 
Futures: Naked Lunch, Blade Runner, and Neuromancer” he turns to Blade Runner to 
highlight the ways in which postmodernism is both greatly influenced by Asian cultures, 
and because of this it suffers from racial anxiety, which fosters an oppression of 
minorities by white, principally American, structures (48).32 Even Harvey turns to the 
film in his book on postmodernism, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry Into the 
Origins of Cultural Change, in order to accentuate the dystopic features of the film’s 
depiction of Los Angeles.33 Central to each of these analyses is an understanding of space 
                                                
32 Yu summarizes his argument on Western cultures oppression of Eastern cultures in postmodernity in 
stating, “In their attempts to localize the operations of global capitalism, these portraits of the postmodern 
city expose the extent to which the imagining of postmodernism has been grounded in Orientalism and 
racial anxiety. While these urban fantasies portray fears of postmodernity through the threat of a reverse 
colonization of the West by the East, at times they also propose in response a recolonization that reasserts 
the hegemony of the white Western subject” (48). 
33 In his chapter titled “Time and Space in Postmodern Cinema” Harvey states, “The Los Angeles to which 
the replicants return is hardly a utopia. The flexibility of the replicants’ capacity to labour in outer space is, 
as we have recently come to expect, matched in Los Angeles by a decrepit landscape of deindustrialization 
and post-industrial decay. Empty warehouses and abandoned industrial plant drip with leaking rain. Mist 
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as an ominous force that fosters oppression and racism, a force that disrupts the temporal 
links between the past, present, and future, and a force that, in its kaleidoscopic nature, 
turns the urban realm into a dystopian milieu of waste and excessive consumerism. 
 Vivian Sobchack’s analysis of Blade Runner in her concise and significant article 
“Cities on the Edge of Time: The Urban Science Fiction Film” falls in line with the 
aforementioned literature in that she is primarily interested in the film’s spatiality. 
Furthermore, her work with the film aligns more directly with my own methodology in 
that she pivots the film in relationship to a historical trajectory of the ways in which 
cinema looks at space. To be more specific, her article creates a historical trajectory of 
cinematic images of the city, mostly from science fiction films, dating between the 1930s 
(the films in the 1930s she references are actually films of the fantasy genre)34 to the 
1980s in order to describe the ways in which the “transformation of contemporary urban 
experience” changes throughout history (5).35 Sobchack outlines four different time 
periods, each of which represents the city in a distinct manner.  With its emphasis on the 
vertical and majestic skyscrapers, cinema of the 1930s echoes the early modernist themes 
of futurism by representing the city as the site of the new, of “aspiration” and 
                                                                                                                                            
swirls, rubbish piles up, infrastructures are in a state of disintegration that makes the pot-holes and failing 
bridges of contemporary New York look mild by comparison” (310). 
34 Sobchack points this fact out in her article when she states that the science fiction genre did not begin 
until the 1950s (6). 
35 At the beginning of her article Sobchack states, “…the SF film concretely ‘real-izes’ the imaginary and 
the speculative in the visible spectacle of a concrete image. Thus, it could be argued that because it offers 
us the most explicitly poetic figuration of the literal grounds of contemporary urban existence, the SF city 
and its concrete ‘realization’ in American cinema also offers the most appropriate representational grounds 
for a phenomenological history of the spatial and temporal transformation of the city as it has been 
culturally experienced from the 1950s (when the American SF film first emerged as a genre) to the present 
(in which the genre enjoys unprecedented popularity)” (4-5). 
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“transcendence” (8).36 In the cinema of the 1950s Sobchack turns to disaster films such as 
When Worlds Collide (Maté) and On the Beach (Kramer) to show that cinema’s 
representation of the city during this historical time period was on of depicting the urban 
realm as a locus of destruction and “emptiness” (11).37 It should not be too much of 
surprise to note here the similarities between this understanding of the city and the any-
spaces-whatever of time-image regime’s connection to spaces of ruble and emptiness. In 
cinema of the 1970s Sobchack then goes onto to show that here cinema now represents 
the city as a claustrophobic place of overpopulation (13).38 Finally, Sobchack’s last 
historical marker is the 1980s and here she turns to Blade Runner, along with Repo Man 
(Cox), to show that in late capitalism cinema represents the city as a “junkyard” of 
backwards euphoria. Here, the city remains a crowded and suffocating realm, but unlike 
the 1970s, this phenomenon is celebrated through obsessive consumerism (Sobchack 
14).39 Thus, if we look at Sobchack’s overall historical trajectory, we can note that within 
her work lies an evolution of space as that which grows from fostering movement, 
futurity, and “aspiration” to a realm of emptiness and destruction, a realm that she 
                                                
36 Here, Sobchack turns to the films King Kong (Cooper, 1933) and The Wizard of Oz (Fleming, 1939) (7-
8). 
37 Sobchack contrasts cinema’s representation of the city in the 1950s from that of the 1930s in stating, 
“The 1950s I am describing here is not about resolution, but about dissolution. Its poetic reverberations 
have nothing to do with aspiration and ascendancy and everything to do with, as Sontag (1965, 44) puts it, 
‘the fantasy of living through one’s own death and more, the death of cities, the destruction of humanity 
itself’” (10-11). 
38 Here Sobchack turns to the film Soylent Green (Fleischer, 1973) and states, “This is a New York City 
that no longer aspires, but suffocates and expires. Visible emphasis is not on the height of buildings but 
their baseness. Verticality is no longer significant – and emphasis on the city’s horizontal dimension 
stresses its limitation, not its openness” (13). 
39 Sobchack summarizes this phenomenon in stating, “In a complete reversal, the imaginary SF city’s 
lowness, baseness, horizontality, its crowdedness, overpopulatedness, and overstuffedness are celebrated 
and aestheticized. That is, the old imaginary and centered SF metropolis is totally resigned to its ruination, 
its displacement to its own edges, its concrete transformation from city as center to city as inner, from 
aspiring city to city dump” (14). 
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describes as “nostalgic – always already fixed on an unrecoverable past rather than on a 
future that has not yet occurred” (11), and then finally to an understanding of space as 
dominating, contradictory, and intense. This is perhaps a good place for me to venture 
away from these important analyses of Blade Runner and directly carry the film into my 
own discussion of Deleuzian cinema and the plane of immanence, a place that, to my 
knowledge, the film has yet to be taken. To look at it another way, I will now move away 
from analyzing the film’s representational relationship to postmodernism and 
understanding of time as history, and, instead, turn towards the ways in which Blade 
Runner figures the body’s relationship to space and understands time as the realm of 
affect. Throughout my analysis I will continue to indirectly pull from these previous 
readings of the film, but rely on them only so much as to point towards the ways in which 
they, unconsciously, underline a plane of immanence in which space forces bodies into 
states of intense-searching situations. 
 The structuration of Blade Runner’s spatial plane of immanence is one of a 
homogeneous spatiality constituted by contradictory connections. Bruno aptly describes 
the film’s incongruous milieu in stating, “In the postindustrial city the explosion of 
urbanization, melting of the futuristic high-tech look into an intercultural scenario, 
recreates the third world inside the first” (66). Throughout the film we move rapidly in 
and out of urban ghettos and slums populated by minorities and working class individuals 
of various ethnicities (Chinese, Japanese, Egyptian, German, Spanish, and English), 
crowded street vendors, the homeless, garbage that swallows sidewalks and overflows 
onto the streets, and pollution and smoke that hangs in the air.  Here we can call to mind 
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Sobchack’s definition of the city in late capitalism as a “junkyard” (14). Rundown 
historical landmarks turned into residential spaces, high-rise apartments made of metal 
and stone, a proliferation of shopping centers ensconced by large glass windows, hybrid 
techno-clubs and early twentieth century burlesques, massive skyscrapers holding the 
headquarters of global corporations and governmental bodies, and postmodern-esque 
futuristic Egyptian pyramids made of steel and coated with thousands of light bulbs, 
along with an interior complete with Greco-Roman columns make up some of the various 
architectural structures of this Los Angeles. Furthermore, transportation here further 
convolutes this spatial plane of immanence as the streets are crammed with a 
claustrophobic mixture of vehicles of all sizes and masses of walking pedestrians always 
carrying umbrellas to block the never-ending rain, and the skies above become 
topographic layers of flying cars, floating billboards, tips of fire breathing skyscrapers, 
and magnanimous blimps. What Bruno labels as an “excess of scenography” (67), and 
Sobchack refers to as a city that is “literally exhausted – generating that strange blend of 
hysteria and euphoria that comes with utter fatigue” (15), we can translate as an exemplar 
of the intense and schizophrenic nature of this kaleidoscopic spatiality.  
 The diverse facets of the film’s spatiality are anything but fragmented and 
separated from one another. They are, on the other hand, the contradictory realms that 
make up the plane’s single spatiality, and as the film progresses it consciously connects 
these assorted pockets. Harvey’s insights on the film are telling for the way in which he 
accentuates the connectivity within the futuristic Los Angeles:  
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Not only has the ‘third-world’ come to Los Angeles even more than at 
present, but signs of third world systems of labour organization and 
informal labour practices are everywhere. The scales for a genetically 
produced snake are produced in a tiny workshop, and human eyes are 
produced in another (both run by Orientals), indicating intricate relations 
of sub-contracting between highly disaggregated firms as well as with the 
Tyrell Corporation itself. (310-311) 
These practically incomprehensible connections become all the more evident as we 
follow the replicants and Deckard on their searches throughout this chaotic milieu of 
sectoral uneven development. 
 The replicant’s search, principally the leader-replicant Roy, is a climb through the 
intense hierarchies of power within the film’s spatial plane of immanence, as Yu points 
out, “…Blade Runner’s cityscape is organized vertically, built upon the contrast of the 
street level (whose denizens the director characterizes as “Spanish,” “Oriental,” and 
“Punk . . . some louts” [Kerman, “Technology” 17]) to the aerial pathways of the police 
hovercraft” (54). We first meet Roy on a crowded and rainy street within one of the 
downtown Los Angeles slums where he is waiting with Leon, another replicant, outside 
the latter’s dilapidated hotel room. The first stop on Roy’s search for the CEO of the 
Tyrell Corporation, Tyrell himself, is within this same slum where Leon lives. Just down 
the street from Leon’s hotel room is a small workshop where a private contractor and 
engineer (Chew) builds eyes for the Tyrell corporation’s replicants. Chew is by no means 
a prosperous and wealthy individual. As we learn throughout the film, the more 
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prosperous individuals living within downtown Los Angeles reside in the city’s taller 
buildings. For instance, Deckard lives in a high-rise apartment building (his room is on 
the 97th floor). Moreover, the even wealthier and powerful reside either in some kind of 
Los Angeles suburb, as does Tyrell, or live in the off-world colonies. This is all the more 
reason to again bring up Sobchack’s understanding of cities in science fiction films of the 
1980s as, not just a junkyard, but also as a city that has displaced its traditional centers of 
power: “…the old, imaginary and centered SF metropolis is totally resigned to its 
ruination, its displacement to its own edges, its concrete transformation from city as 
center to city as inner, from aspiring city to city dump” (14). The physically lower levels 
of the city’s downtown region are the home of the underprivileged of all kinds: the poor, 
the homeless, the unemployed, and the sick, in short, all the different faces of the 
industrial reserve army. Chew, the eye engineer, is no exception, and it is worth pointing 
out that he is one of the members of the various ethnic minorities that reside in these 
lower levels of Los Angeles. His workshop, and probably residence, reeks deprivation as 
it looks more like an underground dungeon than a scientific laboratory. The tiny space is 
suffocating, the air temperature is below zero, and steel and concrete walls prevent one 
from conceiving the interior space’s connections to the external world. It is no surprise 
then that Yu descrbes the replicants journey in the film in stating, “In this reassertion of 
racial hierarchy, the basis of the economy in the Orient is repressed as the replicants 
ascend the hierarchy of power” (58). 
 The next stop on Roy’s search takes him to J.F. Sebastian, a genetic designer for 
the Tyrell Corporation, which means that Sebastian designs the minds of the replicants. 
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Like the Chew, Sebastian lives in downtown Los Angeles as he is also one of the 
underprivileged labourers of the Tyrell Corporation. But unlike Chew, Sebastian’s work 
seems to be a more highly skilled labour than making the replicant’s eyes (perhaps in the 
future making eyes is a pretty straightforward task, as Chew tells Roy, “I just make 
eyes.”), and, it is important to note that, Sebastian is a white male whereas Chew is an 
Asian minority. The main reason why Sebastian is stuck in downtown Los Angeles is 
because he suffers from a genetic disease that causes him to age faster than normal. This, 
of course, is to the advantage of the Tyrell Corporation as it allows the company to 
extract more labour from lower socioeconomic regions. Because of Sebastian’s more 
skilled labour and, again channeling Yu’s insights on race and hierarchies of power, his 
race, Sebastain’s living space is more inviting and comfortable than Chew’s cramped 
workspace-residence (58).40 Sebastian lives in the now abandoned and rundown 
Bradbury Building and is therefore able to put some vertical distance between himself 
and the lower levels of downtown Los Angeles, as he lives in the upper floors of the old 
historical building. 
 The next and final stop on Roy’s search takes him outside downtown Los Angeles 
and into, what I can only assume to be, the most affluent Los Angele suburb where Tyrell 
resides in one of the aforementioned postmodern steel Egyptian-Greco-Roman pyramids. 
Thus Roy’s search ends with him reaching the highest geographical point of Los Angeles, 
as the pyramids are not only located just outside downtown Los Angeles, but also tower 
                                                
40 Here Yu states, “Though Chew himself exist at street level and cannot move vertically, his assistance is 
required for the replicants to gain access to their white mediator, J.F. Sebastian, who can. (Chew works on 
the ground floor, while Sebastian’s security clearance is necessary for Roy to ascend in the elevator to 
Tyrell’s suite)” (58).  
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above the city’s interior core and in doing so they accentuate the power they hold over 
the kaleidoscopic spatiality that they have created.  
 Roy’s existence on this kaleidoscopic plane of immanence is one of an intense-
searching situation. The primary force that opposes and obstructs Roy’s movements is 
space and nothing but space. For as we learn throughout the film, Roy is a superior body: 
He is the leader of the replicants, his physical capabilities are unmatched by any human, 
and he is an intelligent being who can outsmart Tyrell in a chess match. But on this socio-
geographical patchwork of contradictory connections, Roy is reduced to a searcher 
trapped within the maze of sectoral uneven development. Rather than displaying his 
physical prowess throughout the film, Roy’s journey on this spatiality is one in which 
physicality takes a back seat to asking questions. When confronting Chew, his first order 
of business is to ask how he can get to Tyrell. The eye engineer then leads Roy to 
Sebastian, where Roy’s primary purpose is again to inquire about the locale of Tyrell. 
After continuously probing Sebastian for answers, the genetic designer takes Roy to 
Tyrell. Once he finally confronts his maker, Roy’s questions now concern ways in which 
he can increase his expiring lifespan. He is now searching for time. 
 Blade Runner’s spatial plane of immanence not only takes control over 
movement; it also macerates time. Here time as the realm of futurity and past disappears. 
Roy and the other replicants are expiring and schizophrenic bodies, as Bruno says, 
“Replicants are condemned to a life composed only of a present tense; they have neither 
past nor memory. There is for them no conceivable future” (70). As we learn throughout 
the film, the replicants have no future because of their four-year life span, and they lack a 
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subjective past, as instead of living through childhood memories, the replicants interiority 
consists of nothing but manufactured implants. Bruno goes on to describe this state 
becoming in turning to Jameson’s schizophrenia: “This kind of relationship to the present 
is typical of schizophrenia. Jameson notes, in fact, that ‘as temporal continuity breaks 
down, the experience of the present becomes powerfully, overwhelmingly vivid and 
material.’ The world comes before the schizophrenic with heightened intensity” (Bruno 
70). This intensity is a direct symptom of a contradictory plane of immanence in which 
space fragments the temporal realm of affect. For when Roy encounters these other 
bodies throughout his search for Tyrell he is not only reduced to asking questions, but the 
affections themselves between these two centers of indetermination (Roy v. Chew, Roy 
v. Sebastian, and Roy v. Tyrell) on the spatial plane of immanence are also fragmented 
into affections without reflections. Deleuze defines affect in stating, “It is this 
combination of a reflecting, immobile unity and of intensive expressive movements 
which constitutes the affect” (C1 87). On this contradictory spatiality, affect has been 
fractured in affections of only intensity. Each of the three separate stops on Roy’s search 
ends with him killing the other bodies he encounters: Chew, J.F. Sebastian, and Tyrell all 
die at the hands of Roy. With the possible exception of Tyrell, these murders are not 
actions of Roy’s free will. They are actions created by the contradictory and 
schizophrenic nature of sectoral uneven development. The expiring replicant, the poor 
eye engineer, and the sick genetic designer are three centers of indetermination, each 
exploited by the Tyrell corporation and brought together by the contradictory connections 
of the film’s spatial plane of immanence where the encounters themselves between these 
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different bodies become encounters of contradiction. Space governing movement and 
fragmenting time into affects of pure intensity.  
 Contradiction and intensity is also that which governs Deckard’s dangerous 
search for the replicants, a search that has been forced upon him by his former boss 
(Inspector Bryant) who reminds Deckard that, “If your not cop, your little people” when 
he initially tries to deny the inspectors orders. Take for example, Deckard’s pursuit and 
encounter with Zhora, a replicant whom masks as a stripper and resides in the heart of the 
suffocating downtown slums. The encounter between these two bodies first takes place 
within a backroom of the cabaret where Zhora works as the snake-garnishing stripper. 
Violence initially lies idle in the background of the encounter between the reluctant blade 
runner without a choice and the expiring replicant. Deckard first plays the role of cunning 
detective and imposter as he masks as a member of a federation representing American 
artists in order to gain further access into Zhora’s private dwelling. At the other end of 
the spectrum, Zhora immediately comes off as extremely capable, clever, and 
intimidating: Her responses to Decakard’s repeated questioning are curt and blunt, she 
uses her pet snake as a means to accentuate her hard demeanor, and she uses her sexuality 
to make her male counterpoint vulnerable. It isn’t long though until violence awakens and 
intensity intrudes upon the encounter. Zhora distracts Deckard by asking him to assist her 
with her wardrobe, which then allows her to abruptly attack the combating body by first 
pinning him to the ground and then choking him. Other bodies then enter the backroom 
and Zhora has no choice but to flee from the cabaret and into the claustrophobic and rainy 
streets of downtown Los Angeles. 
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 Outside in the midst of this schizophrenic spatiality the intensity heightens as 
space intruders more and more on these encountering bodies by turning them into 
animals who frantically flee, chase, and hide. On this pursuit and flee through the 
crowded downtown streets, Deckard and Zohra lose their bearings, fall over the masses 
of other bodies in the rain while trying to move in between and around them. Deckard 
climbs onto a moving bus. Zohra scrambles over the tops of cars. The camera abandons 
its fixed frame and shifts into a formless handheld frame. Deckard thoughtlessly waves 
his gun about in the midst of hundreds of pedestrians and then suddenly shoots Zhora 
dead, thus forcing her body to crash through a series of large glass windows of a 
shopping center.  
 Both Zhora and Deckard are bodies running out time. On this spatial plane of 
immanence constituted by contradiction, one body must eliminate the other. Time has 
been pushed down into affections of pure intensity. Bodies become violent animals. At 
the end of the film when Roy realizes that his time nearly up and his body is expiring he 
becomes more lethal and erratic. He taunts Deckard as a predator taunts its prey, he 
smashes his body through brick walls, in which at one point he even declares “that was 
irrational”, he howls into the night, and he sheds his clothes and gallops in and out of the 
different rooms of the old Bradbury Building. In this world of contradiction, time as the 
realm of thought, experience, and subjectivity becomes replaced by intense violence.  
 In his seminal work The Production of Space, Henri Lefebvre, who is perhaps the 
most important scholar of space, describes the world of global capitalism as one 
constituted by contradictory space:  
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Such is the context of an unfolding ‘economic’ process which no longer 
answers to classical political economy and which indeed defies all the 
computations of the economists. ‘Real property’ (along with 
‘construction’) [which is to say space] is no longer a secondary form of 
circulation, no longer the auxiliary and backward branch of industrial and 
financial capitalism that it once was. Instead it has a leading role, albeit in 
an uneven way, for its significance is liable to vary according to country, 
time or circumstance. The law of unevenness of growth and development, 
so far from becoming obsolete, is becoming worldwide in its application – 
or, more precisely, is presiding over the globalization of a world market. 
(335) 
Central among these spatial contradictions for Lefebvre is a contradiction between space 
and time, a contradiction between capitalism as a global force and affect. In turning to 
Lefebvre’s conceptual apparatus we may be able to expand our articulation of the unique 
locus of time and affect on the spatial plane of immanence of late capitalism.  
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3. The Spatial Trialectic and The Spatial Plane of Immanence 
3.1 American Psycho and Space’s Serial Murdering of Time 
 I have been talking a lot about space: Space and the cinema, space and late 
capitalism, space and the plane of immanence, space and affect. It is impossible to 
conceive of space without thinking about time and movement. This we all know. Gilles 
Deleuze’s understanding of the cinema is essentially a delineation of the ways in which 
the cinema adjusts and readjusts how it figures time, space, and movement throughout its 
evolution with the world. In the prewar cinema, movement governs time and space. In the 
immediate postwar cinema, time governs space and movement. The historical trajectory 
that I have been carving out throughout this thesis certainly implies that in late capitalism 
cinema now makes space that which trumps all. In a sense this is true, but it is also a 
reductionist claim, as it overlooks one of the most important and novel qualities of this 
era of cinema. The movement-image regime simply pushes time to the periphery of its 
plane of immanence. It turns time into an “indirect representation”, and it leans on 
determined and hodological spaces to celebrate movement (Deleuze, C1 ix).41 In the 
time-image regime movement and space are at the complete service of the dominant 
realm of temporality, as “false movement” and any-spaces-whatever are some of the most 
important means by which movement and space reinforce time as the main mode of 
figuration on this temporal plane of immanence (Deleuze, C2 xi).42 These are all, in a 
                                                
41 In the preface to Cinema 1 Deleuze states, “Their [the perception-image, affection-image, and action-
image] distribution certainly does determine a representation of time, but it must be noted that time remains 
an object of an indirect representation in so far as it depends on montage and derives from movement-
images” (ix).  
42 In the preface to Cinema 2 Deleuze states, “And thanks to this loosening of the sensory-motor linkage, it 
is time, ‘a little time in the pure state’, which rises up to the surface of the screen. Time ceases to be derived 
from the movement, it appears in itself and itself gives rise to false movements” (xi). 
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sense, and act of moving around or reshuffling of time, space and movement on these 
respective planes of immanence so as to allow one of these three entities to be the central 
mode of figuration. The plane of immanence of late capitalism differs from these 
preceding cinematic regimes in that it changes the relationship between these three modes 
of figuration from one of association to one of contradiction. The American cinema of 
late capitalism is a cinema that, for the first time, works primarily through a contradiction 
between space and time, a contradiction between capitalism as a global force and affect, a 
contradiction between the spatial realm of control and power and the temporal realm of 
passively experiencing and living in space. Inherent to the spatial plane of immanence of 
late capitalism is a violent struggle between time and space, a struggle in which space 
always wins by forcefully repressing time and pinning it down into fits of violence and 
intensity.  
 What could be the most over the top, but also one of the most instructive and 
insightful figurations of this violent contradiction between the spatial realm of control 
and the temporal realm of passively living in space comes in Mary Harron’s American 
Psycho. For this is a film that, above all, figures the temporal realm of affect as that 
which is under attack by space. The film about a yuppie stockbroker who moonlights as a 
serial killer and resides within the homogenous upper class of Manhattan works through 
the contradictions between space and time by opposing the literal and physical higher 
realms of the city against Manhattan’s lowest terrains. The two-sided nature of the film’s 
protagonist (Patrick) plays a vital role in figuring this contradiction. On the one hand, 
Patrick is the epitome of power and wealth. He works in a skyscraper on Wall Street as a 
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stockbroker, he lives in the upper floors of the lavish American Gardens Building on 
West 81st Street, he hangs out at yacht clubs, dines in five star restaurants, and wears the 
most expensive suits that money can buy. On the other hand, Patrick is a murderous 
psychopath. He often spends his nights pooling within the cracks of Manhattan’s 
homogeneity in order to seek out victims whom will satisfy his insane urges. His victims 
are, more often than not, people of the sub-proletariat, principally the poor, the homeless, 
and prostitutes. In short, Patrick’s alternative lifestyles expose the contradictions between 
dominating space and dominated time. During the day Patrick resides within spaces of 
power, with the most emphatic space being his upper floor office, a space that allows him 
to literally tower above Manhattan’s spatiality. But at night, Patrick searches for prey 
within the lowest levels of the city’s layout. These are Manhattan’s most destitute facets: 
Dark alleys, street corners exuding blight, and urban caves under bridges where pollution 
creates a low-lying mist. On this homogeneous spatiality of the city, these are the 
temporal fissures of experiencing and living in the dominated spatiality of Manhattan. 
 Throughout the film Patrick frequently visits these temporal fissures in order 
quench his murderous desires. Upon choosing his prey, Patrick then takes them back to 
his home, the place in which the contradictions between space and time, the high and 
low, control and impotence, collide in the most intense manner. The bourgeois 
apartments in which Patrick resides gives us something like a paradoxical take on the 
temporal realm of living in space. In other words, the spaces in which Patrick resides are 
the inverse to the lowly spaces in which his victims of the poor live in. To begin with, the 
affluent apartments in which Patrick inhabits are held in high-rise structures that tower 
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above the city streets, thus making it impossible to conceptualize such spaces as 
passivity.43  Instead, it is more accurate to group these towering homes among the other 
skyscrapers that control the city. Furthermore, within these high-rises the omnipresence 
of the commodity fetish all but erases time and affect. Take Patrick’s apartment for 
example. This cold space is filled with all the trappings of a bourgeois-yuppie. Sleek and 
black furniture, stainless-steel kitchen appliances, hardwood floors, white walls, 
panoramic windows, and sliding glass doors constitute the bones of his living space. 
Moreover, an in-home tanning bed, a wardrobe worth millions, all of the newest 
technological devices, and a plethora of cosmetic products fill in the apertures of the 
skeletal structure. In short, both Patrick’s lifestyle as a stockbroker-serial killer, and his 
paradoxical living space further contribute to the city’s assault on time.  
 American Psycho’s Manhattan is, above all, a spatiality that represses time. It 
forces it down into cracks and fissures that lie on the city’s lowest levels: On street 
corners, under bridges, in alleys. And within these spaces lie those who passively 
experience space. Patrick takes us to these dominated realms on his violent searches. 
Once he has lured his prey out from these fractures of time, he takes them up into his own 
space of power where time moves from being repressed into alleys and street corners to 
being pulverized into fits of violence and intensity. Simply put, within these icy 
aboveground lairs exuding with wealth and materialism the affection-image becomes 
fragmented into images of pure intensity, as here bodies become violent searching and 
fleeing animals.  
                                                
43 As Patrick says in his opening monologue, “I live in the American Gardens Building on West 81st Street, 
on the 11th floor.” 
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 The scene in which Christy desperately attempts to escape from Patrick within 
one of these high-rise apartments is vital. To begin with, Christy embodies one of 
Patrick’s typical victims, as she is a prostitute who comes from one of the lowly fractal 
street corners of Manhattan. While riding in the back of his private limo, Patrick picks 
Christy up in what appears to be a wasteland-outskirt of some kind of power plant. He 
takes her back to one of the bourgeois apartments where the commodity fetish dominates 
the encounters between Patrick, Christy, and a third woman named Elizabeth. Elizabeth 
asks Christy about what college she went to, whether or not she summers in South 
Hampton, and where she works. Christy tells Patrick that this apartment is nicer than his 
other one, and Patrick laces white wine with narcotics. Elizabeth asks Patrick about his 
job, talks about her college years, and Patrick adoringly listens to and discusses pop 
music. These superficial interactions are, in other words, interactions of space. 
Interactions in which space and materialism block out time and affect. Space pins time 
down until it can only find a means of expression through horrific violence. On this 
spatial plane, the affection-image arises when Patrick attacks Elizabeth within the 
bedroom. It then grows with Christy promptly transforming into a fleeing animal, 
desperately searching for a way out of Patrick’s hostile dwelling. Christy runs out of the 
bedroom and down a hall. The camera shifts into handheld to figure the chaos of the 
situation. She turns left and opens the door at the end of the hall to find that it is a closet 
filled with two bloodied corpses. She runs down another hall and enters a room where 
more dead bodies are sprawled across the ground. She attempts to double back, but now 
Patrick is pursing her and he is armed with a chainsaw. She runs down another hall only 
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to find more blood and bodies on a bathroom floor. All the while a mobile camera and 
unstable frame continue to figure this state of confused searching, space attacking affect. 
Patrick catches up to her. She escapes his grasp and exits the apartment. She flees down a 
corridor, screaming and pounding on the neighbors’ doors. She then scrambles down a 
staircase where Patrick violently ends the pursuit.  
 The film’s climactic sequence figures the ways in which space cuts the affection-
image into images of pure intensity by pitting Patrick’s scrambling body against the 
entire spatial layout of Manhattan. At the film’s climax, Patrick becomes so overwhelmed 
by his bourgeois-yuppie lifestyle that he transforms from a serial killer to a fleeing 
animal, an intense-searcher. Rather than spending his nights cruising in his limo for 
victims, Patrick finds himself delusional and frantically scrambling on foot in and out of 
Manhattan’s streets, alleys, and skyscrapers. This night of chaos begins when Patrick 
shoots an innocent pedestrian in an ATM vestibule, and then promptly flees out onto the 
street as the cops are now pursuing him. He frantically tries breaking into cars, he runs 
down an alley, and then finds himself in a shootout with a mob of police officers. A car 
explodes. Patrick now loses his bearings and as he does so the camera losses its stability. 
He is now completely at the mercy of space. He runs towards a high-rise apartment 
building, thinking it is the building in which he resides. He enters the main floor lobby 
only to realize that he is in the wrong building. He shoots both the security guard and a 
janitor. He exits the building and is back outside in the midst of the Manhattan 
skyscrapers. Here the film then cuts to a breathtaking image that unequivocally captures 
the ominous and enveloping character of space on this plane of immanence. Through a 
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slightly low angle position with a long-shot, long-take, and deep focus photography we 
see a miniscule Patrick in the lower level of the frame scrambling across the pavement 
like an ant, and in the midground and background five different brightly lit skyscrapers 
tower above his impotent body.  
 Patrick’s search continues the next day. He returns to Paul Allen’s apartment, one 
of the apartments in which he had been murdering victims, including Christy and 
Elizabeth, and storing their corpses. Upon entering the apartment he is shocked to find 
that the entire interior is covered in fresh white paint, and a real estate agents is showing 
it to potential homeowners. Patrick looks in one of the closets and instead of dead bodies 
he finds buckets of paint. The real estate agent confronts him and orders him to leave and 
not to come back. Confused, Patrick stumbles out of the apartment that just nights before 
was one of his murderous dens, but is now completely whitewashed. As one character 
says earlier in the film, “People just disappear. The earth just opens up and swallows 
them.” On this spatial plane of immanence, people no longer have insides. It is not just 
Patrick who is insane. It is Reagan’s façade as a “harmless old codger,” and it is the rest 
of the Manhattan powerful, the realm of controlling space, who have been cleaning up 
after Patrick’s hideous crimes all along.  
 
3.2 Bringing Lefebvre into the Conversation 
 I now want to turn to Henri Lefebvre’s work on both space and time in order to 
begin diving more directly into this space-time contradiction, this contradiction between 
controlling space and being dominated by space, that is so crucial to the spatial plane of 
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immanence. For one of the salient aspects of Lefebvre’s spatial trialectic is a struggle 
between space and time. This contradiction plays a central role in his understanding of 
the ways in which capitalism continues to grow and create fractures within the world. Let 
us turn to one of Lefebvre’s more emphatic delineations of this space-time opposition: 
With the advent of modernity time has vanished from social space. It is 
recorded solely on the measuring-instruments, on clocks, that are as 
isolated and functionally specialized as this time itself. Lived time loses its 
form and its social interest – with the exception, that is, of time spent 
working. Economic space subordinates time to itself; political space 
expels it as threatening and dangerous (to power). The primacy of the 
economic and above all of the political implies the supremacy of space 
over time. It is thus possible that the error concerning space that we have 
been discussing actually concerns time more directly, more intimately, 
than it does space, time being even closer to us, and more fundamental. 
Our time, then, this most essential part of lived experience, this greatest 
good of all goods, is no longer visible to us, no longer intelligible. It 
cannot be constructed. It is consumed, exhausted, and that is all. It is 
concealed in space, hidden under a pile of debris to be disposed of as soon 
as possible; after all, rubbish is a pollutant. 
 This manifest expulsion of time is arguably one of the hallmarks of 
modernity. . . . Time may have been promoted to the level of ontology by 
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the philosophers [Deleuze is certainly one of the most adamant of these 
time-obsessed philosophers], but it has been murdered by society. (95-96) 
I believe that this space-time conflict, space’s serial murdering of time, reaches its 
ultimate climax in our contemporary historical situation of late capitalism. This is so 
principally because of the global reach that capitalism attains in late capitalism. 
 Globalization gives more life to space through its uprooting of traditional centers 
of accumulation and proliferation of new centers. Lefebvre tells us that the concept of 
centrality is essentially a contradiction between space as an abundant entity and space as 
scarcity. Space as scarcity refers to marking off and creating “restricted” areas of space 
that are only available to those with power and wealth. These areas of space are not 
simply places where accumulation in the strictest sense occurs; they are also, as Lefebvre 
says, “centres of decision making” (333). The abundance of space refers to the 
potentiality of space. This is not the space where decision-making is made. It is, however, 
space available to and created by those with power, but it is, at the same time, always a 
little out of reach and thus constantly susceptible to change (Lefebvre 333).44 In a 
powerful statement, Lefebvre asserts that what makes our present society different from 
that which came before us is that “centrality now aspires to be total” (332). Thus this 
contradiction between abundant space (the lowly terrains of American Psycho’s 
Manhattan) and scarce space (the film’s skyscrapers and high-rise apartments) permeates 
throughout the entire world creating a global structure constituted by an explosion of 
                                                
44 Lefebvre delineates the contradiction between shortage of space and abundant space in stating, “Shortage 
of space has original and new characteristics as compared with other kinds of shortages, whether ancient or 
modern. In so far as it results from a historical process, it occurs spontaneously, yet it is sustained, and 
often sought and organized, by centrally made decisions. It introduces a contradiction between past and 
possible future abundance on the one hand and actually reigning scarcity on the other” (333). 
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centers of accumulation, power, and decision-making, and diverse areas of exploitation, 
manipulation, and potentiality. This is, in short, the kaleidoscopic world of sectoral 
uneven development, a world that is simultaneously homogeneous (space as abundant) 
and fragmented (space as scarce). Cinema thus follows suit and adapts to globalization by 
shifting space from the realm of the passive to the realm of the active. It replaces the 
fragmented temporal plane of immanence of the any-space-whatever with a 
homogeneous spatiality constituted by the convoluted and contradictory world structure 
of total centrality. Lefebvre tells us that,  
Knowledge, consciousness and social practice may thus all be seen to 
share the centre. There is no ‘reality’ without a concentration of energy, 
without a focus or core – nor, therefore, without the dialectic: centre-
periphery, accretion-dissipation, condensation-radiation, glomeration-
saturation, concentration-eruption, implosion-explosion. What is the 
‘subject’? A momentary centre. The ‘object’? Likewise. The body? A 
focusing of active (productive) energies. The city? The urban sphere? 
Ditto. (399) 
Centrality and contradiction make up the spatial plane of immanence. This is a plane of 
immanence where centers of indetermination, lived bodies, conflict with and become 
dominated by the city and the urban sphere, by violent buildings and structures of control, 
by “spatial practice” and “representations of space”. Bringing Lefebvre’s spatial trialectic 
into the spatial plane of immanence is one of the keys to identifying the ways in which 
the cinema of late capitalism works through an intense struggle between space and time. 
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 The overall agenda of Lefebvre’s seminal work, The Production of Space, is 
anything but straightforward. On the one hand, the book is a critique against modern 
philosophy and it’s obsession with time, binaries, the dialectic, and misreadings and 
applications of Marxist thought. On the other hand, the book can be read as something of 
a history of the ways in which the production of space has changed over the course of the 
world as it moves from one mode of production to another (Lefebvre 46).45 This is the 
movement from ‘absolute space’ (Absolute space is similar to determined space in that it 
is space rooted to nature and humanity, space where humans rely on nature to create 
organic social relations.46) to ‘abstract space’ (In abstract space organic social relations 
are replaced by social relations determined by accumulation and the commodity fetish. 
Here time is now at the complete service of production and as a result social relations 
become abstracted from nature.47) then to ‘contradictory space’ (This is the space of class 
struggle, or the inherent contradictions of capitalism that create uneven development.48) 
and then, hopefully, to ‘differential space’ (Differential space is space that is produced by 
the contradictions of space and comes after the “downfall” of abstract space. This space 
signals the end of a certain kind of relations of production, and the beginning of a new 
                                                
45 In the first chapter of The Production of Space, Lefebvre states, “It should be clear from the above that 
the passage from one mode of production to another is of the highest theoretical importance for our 
purposes, for it results form contradictions in the social relations of production which cannot fail to leave 
their mark on space and indeed to revolutionize it” (46). 
46 Lefebvre describes absolute space in stating, “Absolute space, religious and political in character, was a 
product of the bonds of consanguinity, soil and language…” (48). 
47 Here Lefebvre states, “It was during this time that productive activity (labour) became no longer one with 
the process of reproduction which perpetuated social life; but, in becoming independent of that process, 
labour fell prey to abstraction, whence abstract social labour” (49). 
48 Lefebvre shows that the contradictory nature of class struggle is that which combats abstract space: 
“Indeed, it is that struggle alone which prevents abstract space from taking over the whole planet and 
papering over all differences. Only the class struggle has the capacity to differentiate, to generate 
differences which are not intrinsic to economic growth qua strategy, ‘logic’ or ‘system’ – that is to say, 
differences which are neither induced by nor acceptable to that growth. The forms of the class struggle are 
now more varied than formerly. Naturally, they include the political action of minorities” (55). 
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kind of relations of production.49) (Lefebvre 48-55). Or, the book can be read as 
something like a handbook or guide that gives us the conceptual tools (the “perceived,” 
“conceived,” and “lived”) for analyzing, and hopefully changing, our contemporary 
spatial moment. Edward Soja’s reading of Lefebvre should not go unmentioned here. As 
a political geographer, Soja’s understanding of Lefebvre’s work depends heavily on a 
deemphasizing of history. He uses Lefebvre’s work with space to develop a tripartite 
social theory that involves not only historicality and sociality, but also spatiality (Soja, 
Thirdspace 71).50 In doing Soja is, in part, using Lefebvre as a means to remind readers, 
principally Marxists readers, to look at the present. This looking at the present is, in my 
opinion, one of the most important arguments of The Production of Space, and more 
specifically the spatial trialectic. Lefebvre’s own insistence on a trialectic, as opposed to 
a dialectic, derives heavily from his agenda of using space to create a unitary theory that 
bridges the gap between the mental and the physical (11). In addition to the mental and 
the physical, such a theory will also take into consideration the social. It will view the 
current society as an open, as opposed to closed, system that is wrought with violent 
contradictions and mechanisms beyond its own control, mechanisms that can be analyzed 
                                                
49 Here Lefebvre states, “Thus, despite – or rather because of – its negativity, abstract space carries within 
itself the seeds of a new kind of space. I shall call that new space ‘differential space’, because, inasmuch as 
abstract space tends towards homogeneity, towards the elimination of existing differences or peculiarities, a 
new space cannot be born (produced) unless it accentuates differences. It will also restore unity to what 
abstract space breaks up – to the functions, elements and moments of social practice” (52). 
50 In his book Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory, Soja 
articulates this conceptual triad of historicality, sociality, and spatiality, (in this case, temporality, spatiality, 
and social being) in stating, “Just as space, time, and matter delineate and encompass the essential qualities 
of the physical world, spatiality, temporality, and social being can be seen as the abstract dimensions which 
together comprise all facets of human existence. More concretely specified, each of these abstract 
existential dimensions comes to life as a social construct which shapes empirically reality and is 
simultaneously shaped by it. Thus, the spatial order of human existence arises from the (social) production 
of space, the construction of human geographies that both reflect and configure being in the world” (25).   
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and used to change the current mode of production (Lefebvre 11).51 This unitary/spatial 
theory goes against traditional diachronic and dialectical critical theories that depend on 
binaries, oppositions, and “perfect systems” (Lefebvre 39). To put it another way, by 
bringing (social) space into the fold, Lefebvre demands that we turn our critical attention 
towards the present: “Yet this space is always, now and formerly, a present space, given 
as an immediate whole, complete with its associations and connections in their actuality. 
Thus production process and product present themselves as two inseparable aspects, not 
as two separable ideas” (Lefebvre 37). The spatial trialectic is a deemphasizing of the 
historical trajectory of dialectical Marxist thought, a reemphasizing of traditional 
contradictions, and, most importantly, a conceptualizing of new contradictions of 
capitalism. 
 Lefebvre gives us the tools to rethink the contradictions of capitalism in terms of 
space by breaking space apart into three different layers. These spatial layers are: Spatial 
practice (the perceived), Representations of space (the conceived), and Representational 
spaces (the lived). Identifying the differences and connections among the three layers of 
the spatial trialectic is more difficult than one may at first assume. Perhaps the best way 
to begin explaining these three facets of space is to point out the order in which Lefebvre 
describes them. In the first chapter of The Production of Space Lefebvre lists these spatial 
layers two times and both times he lists them in the following order: 1.) Spatial practice, 
                                                
51 In one of Lefebvre’s more telling critiques of critical theory he states, “Some over-systematic thinkers 
oscillate between loud denunciations of capitalism and the bourgeoisie and their repressive institutions on 
the one hand, and fascination and unrestrained admiration on the other. They make society into the ‘object’ 
of a systematization which must be ‘closed’ to be complete; they thus bestow a cohesiveness it utterly lacks 
upon a totality which is in fact decidedly open – so open, indeed, that it must rely on violence to endure. 
The position of these systematizers is in any case self-contradictory: even if their claims had some validity 
they would be reduced to nonsense by the fact that the terms and concepts used to define the system must 
necessarily be mere tools of that system itself” (11). 
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2.) Representations of space, and 3.) Representational space (33 and 38-39).52 Soja’s 
explication of these spatial layers is dependent on this ordering, for he “redescribes” 
spatial practice as “Firstspace,” representations of space as “Secondspace,” and 
representational space as “Thirdspace” (Thirdspace 66 – 68). The ordering of these layers 
moves from the objective to the subjective. Spatial practice describes space at its most 
practical level. Lefebvre explicates Spatial practice in stating, “The spatial practice of a 
society secretes that society’s space . . . From an analytic standpoint, the spatial practice 
of a society is revealed through the deciphering of its space” (38). This is also the realm 
of what Lefebvre calls perceived space. This is so because spatial practice is space that 
we engage with without thinking about. In American Psycho this is simply the spatial 
layout of Manhattan, an understanding of space as nothing more than a physicality that 
we take for granted; it is space that we perceive without conceiving: “This materialized, 
socially produced, empirical space is described as perceived space, directly sensible and 
open, within limits, to accurate measurement and description” (Soja, Thirdspace 66). The 
second layer of space, representations of space, is space as conceived, conceptualized 
space. Lefebvre describes this space as “the space of scientists, planners, urbanists, 
technocratic subdividers and social engineers, as of a certain type of artists with a 
scientific bent . . . This is the dominant space in any society (or mode of production)” 
(38-39). Whereas spatial practice was a dead physical layout, representations of space is 
an understanding of space as that which can be used, molded, and manipulated by 
individuals holding positions of power. Under the historical process of capitalism, this 
layer of conceptualized space has become a space that dominates through, among other 
                                                
52 Lefebvre actually foreshadows these three layers without providing the terminology on pages 8-9. 
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means, ideology, control, and surveillance (Soja, Thirdspace 67). In American Psycho, 
this quality of space is akin to the skyscrapers and other high-rise structures that tower 
above the city’s spatial practice. Lefebvre describes representational space, the third layer 
of space, as space that is “passively experienced” by “users” and “inhabitants” (39). In 
American Psycho these are the lowly spaces in which the homeless, the poor, and 
prostitutes reside. Whereas representations of space refers to space as something thought 
about and dominating, representational space is an understanding of space as lived 
experience and being dominated. Furthermore, within this realm of space lies the locus of 
time and affect: “Representational space is alive: it speaks. It has an affective kernel or 
centre: Ego, bed, bedroom, dwelling, house; or: square, church, graveyard. It embraces 
the loci of passion, of action and of lived situations, and thus immediately implies time” 
(Lefebvre 42). To this list we could add the space under bridges, on street corners, and in 
dark alleys. Taken as a whole then, we can understand these three spatial layers as 
follows: First, perceiving the spatial layout itself; second, conceiving, molding, and 
controlling this spatial layout so as to maintain power and foster inequality; and third, 
living in and passively experiencing this spatial layout as that which dominates. Existing, 
or becoming, in social space is thus a tripartite experience of perceiving space, using 
space, and being dominated by space.  
 The interactions between these three spatial layers create a multitude of 
contradictions. Throughout The Production of Space Lefebvre enumerates on these 
contradictions, some of which include the contradiction between quantity and quality 
(352), the contradiction between homogeneous space and fragmented space (355), the 
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contradiction between exchange value and use value (356), the contradiction between the 
center and periphery (333), the contradiction between knowledge and power (358), the 
contradiction between surplus-value and enjoyment (359), and the contradiction between 
difference and repetition (370-371). Inherent to each of these contradictions is a struggle 
between space and time, a struggle that pits the physical layout of space and the control 
of space against the temporal realm of lived space. Take, for example, the contradiction 
between homogeneous space and fragmented space, and the contradiction between the 
center and periphery. For these are two sides of the same coin. On the one hand, we have 
space as an infinite and enveloping force. Here, Lefebvre even points to the ways in 
which a computer science program can accumulate an infinite amount of information 
concerning any facet of social space (355). On the other hand, the experience of living in 
space is one of being dominated by the division of labour. Uneven development 
determines where we live, where and how we travel through spatial practice, and how our 
bodies move in social space: “The ways in which space is thus carved up are reminiscent 
of the ways in which the body is cut into pieces in images (especially the female body, 
which is not only cut up but also deemed to be ‘without organs’!)” (Lefebvre 355). 
Lefebvre, here, is giving us a direct nod towards Deleuze. Let us open up, a little bit for 
now, this connection between this space dominated world and the Deleuzian philosophy. 
 The “body without organs” is a concept developed by Deleuze and used in his 
two-volume collection, Capitalism and Schizophrenia. The body without organs is 
another term for Deleuze’s understanding of the world as a plane of immanence, a plane 
in which bodies are in a state of perpetual becoming that is determined by the affective 
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encounters with other becoming bodies, or centers of indetermination, that occur on this 
plane/body without organs: “The body without organs is an egg: it is crisscrossed with 
axes and thresholds, with latitudes and longitudes and geodesic lines, traversed by 
gradients marking the transitions and the becomings, the destinations of the subject 
developing along these particular vectors” (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 19). 
Lefebvre’s indirect reference to the plane of immanence is now all the more interesting 
and relevant to my agenda. For when we take into consideration the contradiction that 
Lefebvre exposes between time and space through his spatial trialectic, we can see a body 
without organs, or a plane of immanence, in which space assaults time. Take, for 
example, the ways in which Lefebvre describes the contradiction between knowledge and 
power. The dual characteristic of space as simultaneously homogeneous and fragmented, 
or “intact” and “broken up” (Lefebvre 358), allows power to dominate knowledge by 
forcing the spatial layout into the position of upholding rules and policy, determining 
movement through signs, and routes, enforcing penalties through agents of the state, and 
creating barriers through Private Property and No Trespassing signs. In short, the spatial 
layout disrupts knowledge and freethinking through ideologies that disseminate power 
and make the general population live in a state of deception. Here, the dominated realm 
of representational space and time is perpetually under attack by a “repressive efficacy” 
that masks the ways in which space annihilates time: “Logic and logistics conceal its 
latent violence, which to be effective does not even have to show its hand” (Lefebvre 
358). This is, in other words, a plane of immanence in which becoming is constantly 
barricaded by space. 
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 We can now bring our conversation more directly back to the cinema. From here 
on out I want to explicitly carry Lefebvre’s spatial trialectic into the cinema of late 
capitalism in order to further articulate the ways in which the spatial plane of immanence 
represses and annihilates time. For the spatial structure of this plane is exactly that which 
figures the contradiction between homogeneity and fragmentation. Connectivity persists 
throughout the entire plane of immanence, but the connectivity is determined by the 
contradictions of sectoral uneven development. Within the kaleidoscopic nature of late 
capitalism, spatial practice and representations of space work together to intensify, split, 
and repress representational space, which is to say the realm of time and affect.53 To put 
it another way, when both the control of space and the practicality of space work together 
to create the schizophrenic nature of late capitalism, the lived body’s relationship to his 
or her own milieu is one of stunted becoming and awareness, and an omnipresence of 
violence:  
Lived space bears the stamp of the conflict between an inevitable, if long 
and difficult, maturation process and a failure to mature that leaves 
particular original resources and reserves untouched. It is in this space that 
the ‘private’ realm asserts itself, albeit more or less vigorously, and always 
in a conflictual way, against the public one.54 (Lefebvre 362) 
                                                
53 Lefebvre speaks to this phenomenon when delineating the ways in which the consumption of space 
determines the function of time in stating, “Space is the envelope of time. When space is split, time is 
distanced – but it resists reduction. Within and through space, a certain social time is produced and 
reproduced; but real social time is forever re-emerging complete with its own characteristics and 
determinants: repetitions, rhythms, cycles, activities” (339). 
54 David Harvey describes this distinct phenomenon to postmodernity/late capitalism as an “overwhelming 
sense of compression of our spatial and temporal worlds”, and he goes onto state that, “As space appears to 
shrink to a ‘global village’ of telecommunications and a ‘spaceship earth’ of economic and ecological 
interdependencies – to use just two familiar and everyday images – and as time horizons shorten to the 
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This is the phenomenon of space fragmenting time and affect, a phenomenon that forces 
bodies into intense-searching situations.  
 
3.3 Blue Velvet as a Film that Pulverizes the Home 
 Much has been written on Blue Velvet (Lynch) within the conversation of the 
ambiguous concept of postmodernism. In Fredric Jameson’s seminal work on 
postmodernism, Postmodernism: Or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, he turns to 
Blue Velvet as an example of, what he calls, ‘Nostalgia Films,’ films that corrode 
historicity and prevent us from understanding the present in relationship to the past by 
replacing the past with the pastiche: Stereotypes, clichés, and simulacrum of the past 
(19).55 In short, these films are an assault on time as history, and Jameson sees Blue 
Velvet as one of these films because of its juxtaposition of clichéd images and stereotypes 
of the 1950s past with contemporary 1980s themes and settings (Postmodernism 296).56 
Timothy Corrigan’s book on postmodernism and the cinema, A Cinema Without Walls: 
Movies and Culture after Vietnam, also associates the film with postmodernism by 
identifying its de-temporalizing features. For Corrigan, one of the film’s most important 
qualities includes its assault on existential time through its unveiling of an empty 
subjective interiority. Corrigan’s juxtaposition of Blue Velvet to Hitchcock is instructive, 
                                                                                                                                            
point where the present is all there is (the world of the schizophrenic), so we have to learn how to cope with 
an overwhelming sense of compression of our spatial and temporal worlds” (240). 
55 Jameson defines ‘Nostalgia Films’ as follows: “Nostalgia films restructure the whole issue of pastiche 
and project it onto a collective and social level, where the desperate attempt to appropriate a missing past is 
now refracted through the iron law of fashion change and the emergent ideology of the generation” (19). 
56 Here is Jameson’s summary of his argument concerning Blue Velvet (and Jonathan Demme’s Something 
Wild): “Thus these films can be read as dual symptoms: they show a collective unconscious in the process 
of trying to identify its own present at the same time that they illuminate the failure of this attempt, which 
seems to reduce itself to the recombination of various stereotypes of the past” (Postmodernism 296). 
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Unlike a Hitchcock film, however, in these neighborhoods there is only 
one nature for Jeffery to discover, a horizontal rather than vertical “second 
nature” that flattens and evacuates all human and natural depths. In this 
contemporary version of a “second nature” (as opposed to Benjamin’s) 
there is no nostalgic yearning for a lost place or a hidden meaning (even 
the darker ones of Hitchcock). What the bland, semi-conscious Jeffery 
discovers is that he himself is a violently mechanical reproduction, a 
shimmering surface (like blue velvet) of a decaying environment. (72) 
I mention these two readings of Blue Velvet in order to point to possible ways in which 
one can identify how the film works through a contingent relationship to time. Jameson is 
concerned with time as history and Corrigan is concerned with time as subjectivity. 
Neither of these readings align exactly with my method, but instead lie somewhere in the 
margins. The former is too broad and the latter is too narrow, but both analyses point us 
in the right direction by articulating time as that which is under attack. Where these 
analyses, in my opinion, fall short concerns their inability to dive into the specific ways 
in which space functions as the very force that pulverizes time. By bringing Lefebvre’s 
spatial trialectic into the analysis of Blue Velvet, we can delineate the specific ways in 
which an enveloping and homogeneous spatiality represses time into fissures of intensity. 
 We can begin moving Blue Velvet into the realms of the spatial trialectic and the 
spatial plane of immanence by noting the spatial structure of the film. The entire setting 
of Blue Velvet lies within the artificial city of Lumberton, a weird mixture of homey 
small-town Americana and terrifying miscreancy. The various facets of these two 
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contradictory atmospheres constitute the spatial practice of Lumberton, and they include: 
Middle-class suburban neighborhoods, the ominous slum-like “Deep River Apartments” 
building, the idyllic police station, mysterious warehouses, 1950s style high school and 
diner, sleazy night clubs, log yards and abandon fields, the local family-owned hardware 
store, and dilapidated low-class neighborhoods of drug dealing, kidnapping, and murder. 
The film works through a conscious understanding of its homogenous spatiality, as it 
takes great pains to emphasize its geographical features. Throughout the film, markers 
indicating place reoccur frequently. For example, when Jeffery, the film’s protagonist, 
goes to the police station for the first time we see multiple Lumberton city maps scattered 
throughout the mise-en-scène of the various shots that make up this scene. In one shot in 
particular, Jeffery and Detective Williams stand in the foreground, while one map of 
Lumberton occupies the midground of the mise-en-scène, and a different city map holds 
the background. It is no coincidence that such mapping of the city lies within a 
governmental agency, an agency that falls within the realm of representations of space, 
because it plays an active role in controlling and maintaining the spatial layout of the city. 
In addition to a prevalence of maps, the film also leans heavily on reoccurring 
“establishing shots” of geographical landmarks such as street signs, billboards, and 
signposts of local shops. Furthermore, embedded within the dialogue are references to the 
physical layout of the city. For example, before Jeffery leaves his house to “walk around 
the neighborhood”, his aunt asks him, “Jeffery, you’re not going down by Lincoln are 
you?”, and when Sandy is describing the details of the mysterious missing ear case to 
Jeffery, she says to him, “She lives in an apartment building that is real close your house. 
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It’s also close to the field where you found the ear.” All of this is to say that Blue Velvet’s 
spatial plane of immanence figures an airtight and homogenous spatial layout, and the 
film’s relationship to this spatial layout is anything but passive, as the film willfully 
stresses the differing ways in which the homogeneous spatial practice of Lumberton 
envelopes the bodies residing in it through various formal devices such as the framing 
within the mise-en-scène, individual shot sequence of scenes, and even character 
dialogue. In doing so, the cinematographic concepts of Blue Velvet not only map the 
spatial practice of its plane of immanence, they also figure space as a controlling force, a 
process that allows spatial practice and representations of space to become the 
homogeneous and dominating forces on this plane of immanence. This becomes all the 
more obvious when we turn to the ways in which this single and ominous space 
macerates the temporal realm of representational space. 
 Blue Velvet is not a film that ignores or abandons time. Rather, it spends a 
significant amount of time figuring the ways in which space suppresses time and affect. 
The most emphatic means by which the film figures time as repressed is through turning 
the home and private dwelling into the loci of violence and intensity. The home is the 
temporal realm of the lived, of representational space, and it differs from the spatial 
layout and control of space in that within this spatial realm we have now moved into a 
passively experienced realm. We are, in other words, in a realm of being dominated by 
spatial practice and representations of space. Here, the cinematographic concepts are no 
longer ones of figuring the dominating qualities of space. Instead, the cinematographic 
concepts are now ones of figuring the dominated quality of time. Gone are the maps, 
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street signs, and directional references, and in its place are violent animals. This is, in 
short, the realm in which space fractures time and creates affection-images of pure 
intensity, affection-images without reflection.  
 Consider all of the different moments in which uncontrollable violence enters the 
home. We can take as our first example the opening scene of the film: A seminal 
American image of a man, Jeffery’s Dad, standing outside his suburban home on a sunny 
weekend afternoon and watering his flowers. But then the water hose kinks, struggle 
ensues, the man grabs his neck, he has a stroke and collapses to the ground. Moments 
later, the camera then glides away from looking at the collapsed body and dives 
underground to conclude the scene with images of ravenous ants scavenging within their 
dirt home. Or take the first image of the interior of Jeffery’s suburban home. Through a 
long shot, extreme low-angle, and low-key lighting, the first image that we get of Jeffery 
within his home is an ominous image of him completely covered in shadows and standing 
at the top of a staircase. Throughout the course of the film these images of subverting the 
oasis of the home continuously reappear and in doing so they become more intense. 
Within Dorothy’s apartment (she resides within the mysterious and dilapidated Deep 
River Apartment building just off Lincoln St.) is where she holds a knife to Jeffery’s 
neck, it is also where Frank rapes Dorothy, and where Jeffery taps into his most 
animalistic behaviors while engaging in sadistic intercourse with Dorothy. Within Ben’s 
home (Ben is one of Frank’s drug dealing partners) is where Frank is holding Dorothy’s 
kidnapped son, here also is where Frank and his gang take Jeffery and assault him after 
abducting him, and it is where Frank’s euphoric drug induced high morphs into ferocity 
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as at one point in the scene Frank becomes overwhelmed with a catharsis of emotions 
while listening to Roy Orbison’s “In Dreams” and then seconds later he switches the 
music off and transforms into a savage who screams for sex. Moving back into the more 
affluent parts of Lumberton, at one point within Jeffery’s home he threatens his aunt, and 
Jeffery’s house is where Dorothy, naked and beaten, stumbles to in the middle of the 
night.57 Furthermore, Dorothy’s intrusive presence into American suburbia also enters 
into Sandy’s (Jeffery’s high school sweetheart) home, as this is where Dorothy’s blood 
covered naked body most emphatically subverts the naïve infatuations that Sandy and 
Jeffery share. 
 The climactic sequence of the film is key. Within this sequence we have our most 
acute figuration of repressed time, as, here, bodies morph into the searching and fleeing 
creatures that are so crucial to this spatial plane of immanence. Throughout the course of 
the film Jeffery is our searcher, as he takes it upon himself to solve the mystery of the 
missing ear case. His search takes him in and out of all the different facets of 
Lumberton’s spatial layout, none of which are as important as Dorothy’s apartment. 
Dorothy’s apartment lives up to Lefebvre’s definition of representational space as an 
“affective kernel or centre” (42). Its destitute and sparse atmosphere, combined with an 
ubiquity of pink – Pink carpet, pink walls, pink furniture, and pink drapes – exudes an 
affective aroma. The dominating spatial layers of spatial practice and representations of 
space have, in other words, pushed us down into this fissure of time. On this 
homogeneous spatial plane of immanence, this is where the affection-image lies. At the 
                                                
57 This is also why the film closes with a subverting image of a robin holding a bug inside its mouth outside 
Jeffery’s kitchen window. 
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end of the film, Jeffery enters the apartment one last time in order to finally solve his 
mystery. When he first walks into the apartment he, and viewers alike, are immediately 
struck by a terrifying image of two bloodied corpses in the middle of the living room. 
After collecting himself Jeffery then decides to leave and let the police finish solving the 
case, but upon attempting to exit he realizes that Frank is on his way up to the apartment 
and Jeffery then has no choice but to flee back inside and hide like a mouse hiding from a 
cat. A game of hide and seek ensues within this apartment covered in pink and blood. 
Before Frank enters the apartment Jeffery tries to hide in the back bedroom, but then 
quickly changes his mind and scrambles into the living room closet. Frank enters and 
runs down the hall towards the bedroom with his gun ablaze while verbally taunting his 
prey. He then starts firing aimlessly into the back bedroom. Now even angrier because he 
has yet to kill Jeffery, he runs back into the living room while screaming, “What the fuck. 
Where are you? Where are you?”. He shoots more random objects and peeks into the 
kitchen all the while Jeffery watches from the narrow slits in the closet door. Frank 
slowly approaches the closet. Jeffery then fires his gun and kills the hunter. On the spatial 
plane of immanence, the private dwelling can only assert itself against the public one 
through violence and intensity. 
 
3.4 Dark City and the Search for Time 
 Alex Proyas’ Dark City is something of a more literal articulation of space’s 
manipulation and control of time. The science fiction film about a dying alien species 
known as Strangers whom abduct humans from earth and take them to an outer world 
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where they conduct experiments on them in order to discover the essence of the human 
soul and then hopefully find a cure to their own oncoming extinction is, firstly, a film of 
bodies searching through a milieu in which the temporal realm of representational spaces 
has all but been eliminated. This is, in other words, a film that is searching for time. 
Nearly all of the bodies that constitute Dark City’s plane of immanence are searching 
bodies: John, the film’s protagonist, is searching for his past and Shell Beach, Inspector 
Bumstead, Dr. Schreber, and Emma are all searching for John, Eddie is searching for 
answers, and the Strangers are searching for a cure. All of these searches take place 
within the homogenous maze that is Dark City. Near the beginning of the film, Dr. 
Schreber stands over a large maze and watches mice attempt to maneuver their way 
through the convoluted structure, a structure that he describes to Emma as, “A rather 
crude experiment.” Such is the condition of this spatial plane of immanence. It is a crude 
experiment in which time is under siege and bodies are reduced to searching mice.  
 The structure of this maze-city is one that severely lacks hodological connections. 
In fact, connectivity itself is not even a relevant term to this milieu. For as we learn 
throughout the film, the Strangers control the spatial layout of the city and when they put 
the humans into a trance like sleep every night they revise and modify the city’s spatial 
practice. Thus whenever John asks a fellow pedestrian for directions to Shell Beach, the 
pedestrians are never able to articulate the route to the location. Moreover, rapid-fire 
short-takes and heavy doses of low-key lighting throughout further contribute to turning 
space into an arduous and discombobulated entity, a kaleidoscopic spatiality in which 
movement is constantly obstructed by space. Take, for example, one of the scenes in 
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which John flees throughout the city in order to escape the Strangers. The chase begins 
with him jumping across moving rooftops that rise and fall at the control of the Strangers 
minds. A rising building that shoots up from the ground knocks John into the air. He 
breaks his fall by grabbing onto a fire escape. Another tall building then slides into the 
fire escape, nearly squishing John but he escapes again by breaking through a window 
and entering into an apartment building. The chase continues in an alley. John is 
cornered, but he spots a door with an exit sign over it. He flings the door open but on the 
other side is nothing except empty space, a giant free fall. He leaps into the air and grabs 
onto a rising chimney, which then takes him to another rooftop. He scrambles down to 
the ground level where the pursuit ends on a busy street. The true salience of Dark City, 
however, does not concern this spatial plane of immanence’s figuration of obstructed 
movement. Rather, it concerns the plane’s figuration of a contradiction between time and 
space. 
 The plane of immanence of Dark City is exactly that which figures a contradiction 
between time and space. Turning to Lefebvre’s spatial trialectic and reading it directly 
alongside Deleuze’s own interpretation of coexisting temporalities will allows us to, first, 
further articulate this distinguishing feature of this plane of immanence of late capitalism, 
and, second, more firmly fuse these two different philosophies (Lefebvre and Deleuze) 
onto the cinema. Prevalent throughout Dark City are images of spirals. We can interpret 
the spiral in two ways. On the one hand, it is a representation for the maze that is the city 
in which bodies exist – this is a spatial spiral. On the other hand, the spiral can be 
understood as an ironic symbol referring to that which is missing in the city. The spiral 
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represents a longing for time, a longing for the past. In Cinema 2 Deleuze uses the figure 
of the spiral to delineate time as something multiple and coexistent: “The dividing in two, 
the differentiation of two images, actual and virtual, does not go to the limit, because the 
resulting circuit repeatedly takes us back from one kind to the other. There is only a 
vertigo, an osciallation” (84). For Deleuze, the spiral is that which shows that past and 
present move simultaneously. In fact, the present is overwhelmed and enveloped by the 
past. This is a crucial feature of the temporal plane of immanence. In delineating the role 
of time in the time-image regime, Deleuze relies heavily on Henri-Louis Bergson’s 
understanding of time as a non-chronological and coexistent interaction between the past 
and present, a phenomenon in which the past never disappears, but instead always moves 
with and ensconces the present (C2 82).58 Deleuze describes the realm of the past as the 
realm of subjectivity, the realm of the virtual, the realm of affect:  
Subjectivity is never ours, it is time, that is, the soul or the spirit, the 
virtual. The actual is always objective, but the virtual is subjective: it was 
initially the affect, that which we experience in time; then time itself, pure 
virtuality which divides itself in two as affector and affected, ‘the affection 
of self by self’ as definition of time. (C2 82-83)  
On the temporal plane of immanence the affection-image holds a central position because 
of this nature of coexisting temporalities, a phenomenon in which time moves through 
space and eliminates all homogeneity.  
                                                
58 Deleuze summarizes Bergson’s theories on time as follows, “Bergson’s major theses on time are as 
follows: the past coexists with the present that it has been; the past is preserved in itself, as past in general 
(non-chronological); at each moment time splits itself into present and past, present that passes and past 
which is preserved” (C2 82). 
  97 
   
 In Dark City, however, there is no past. Throughout the film we learn that one of 
the main reasons why the Strangers are able to change the spatial layout of the city every 
night is because once they put the humans to sleep they erase their memories. Thus the 
humans who occupy this city are humans without a past, or even future. These are 
schizophrenic humans of the perpetual present and none is as telling as the Eddie 
character. Eddie is this spatial plane of immanence’s most emphatic figuration of an 
affection-image that has been fractured by space and split into images of pure intensity. 
Eddie is, in other words, an intense-searcher suffering from a lack of time. We first meet 
Eddie inside his shack-like home turned into a decrepit dwelling of psychotic obsessions. 
Eddie is a former police detective who has became obsessed with the idea that something 
within the world he lives is not right. He has begun to realize that he lacks a past, as he 
tells inspector Bumstead, “I’ve been trying to remember things, clearly remember things 
from my past. But the more I try to think back, the more it all starts to unravel.” His life 
has now become one of trying to solve this mystery. This is Eddie’s search for time and it 
is a search that has turned him into a violent animal who scares his wife, screams 
irrationally, and throws boots at bugs that reside in his din with him. The walls of his 
home serve as giant notepads in which he scribbles words, erratically sketches his fears 
and obsessions, and draws large spirals. On this plane of immanence, space has all but 
erased the temporal spiral. It has removed it from the realm of figuration and demoted it 
to a sad relic in the background. Here coexisting temporalities have disappeared, the 
perpetual present has replaced a past that moves with and envelops the present, affect has 
lost its two sides of reflection and intensity by becoming fractured into affection-images 
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of pure intensity: Violent obsessions and, eventually, suicide. As Eddie tells John just 
before he takes his own life, “There’s no way out, you know. You can’t get out of the 
city, believe me I’ve tried . . . But that’s okay. I figured a way out.” On this homogeneous 
plane of immanence, the only thing that moves with the present is space. This is a 
schizophrenic spatiality, a spatiality that attacks time and becoming through intensity. 
Here the past, the virtual, time, and affect are no longer that which overwhelms and 
envelops the present. The spatial plane of immanence of late capitalism brings space into 
this realm of totality. Now, it is space that swallows and envelops time. A schizophrenic 
spatiality is, in other words, a spatiality in which spatial practice and representations of 
space overwhelm and overpower the temporal realm of representational space. 
 The Strangers control space and time, or, to put it another way, the Strangers use 
space to annihilate time. Just before taking his own life Eddie tells John that the Strangers 
change things when the humans go to sleep. This is not only when the aliens erase 
humans’ memories. It is also when they most emphatically figure their relationship to the 
city as one of representations of space by modifying and revising the city’s spatial layout. 
As previously mentioned, Lefebvre defines representations of space as, “conceptualized 
space, the space of scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social 
engineers, as of a certain type of artists with a scientific bent…” (38). The Strangers are 
all of these different professions that contribute to controlling space, as their use of space 
is purely scientific, space as thought and conceived, rather than lived. Lefebvre tells us 
that in prioritizing the conceived over the lived we run the risk of destroying life: “Like 
all social practice, spatial practice is lived directly before it is conceptualized; but the 
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speculative primacy of the conceived over the lived causes practice to disappear along 
with life…” (34). The Strangers experiments on humans are exactly that which destroy 
the temporal realm of life through conceived space. Take, for example, the film’s most 
literal articulation of this process. It begins in the Strangers’ underground liar where a 
giant clock holding the background becomes the dominant image of this mise-en-scène. 
The clock strikes twelve midnight and then we cut to a multitude of images of humans 
sleeping in the city. Time is now dead. The clock stops ticking and in its place space 
comes to life: Staircases expand, structures merge into each other, streets are redirected, 
giant buildings shoot into the sky, while others shrink to the ground. In the midst of all 
this we cut back to the Strangers’ meditating in their dungeon as they continue to use 
their minds to manipulate the city’s spatial practice. Once they finish revising the 
spatiality of the city and the buildings and streets are firmly set in their new locales, the 
clock begins moving again and the humans wake up. This is the act of space burying and 
swallowing time, physical-spatial structures replacing past memories. Instead of a spiral 
of coexisting temporalities, this plane of immanence is more like an enclosed ring 
crammed full with all the different facets of spatial practice and representations of space, 
as one of the Strangers tells John when describing the control they hold over the city, 
“There’s no escape. The city’s ours. We made it. … We fashioned this city on stolen 
memories. Different eras, different pasts, all rolled into one.” And this is why all of the 
bodies on this plane of immanence are thrown into intense-searching situations.   
 These searching bodies are searching for time, affect, representational space. 
Throughout majority of the film this realm is either buried underground or forced into the 
  100 
   
cracks of decrepit homes of psychotic obsessions: The space of the Stranger’s 
underground liar where time ticks and the Strangers reflect and meditate, or the space of 
Eddie’s decaying and violent home. But there is one other place in which this temporal 
realm can be found on Dark City’s spatial plane of immanence. Throughout majority of 
the film, this realm is only spoken of and not seen or found. It is a wish, a longing for 
something instinctively desired, but at the same time forgotten.  
 Throughout the entire film, even with an erased memory, John is instinctively 
searching for Shell Beach, the place where, we are told, he would enjoy “running along 
the waves as a child.” Thus the beach or the sea or the water is the Deleuzian realm of the 
past and the virtual. It is something like a memory, a thought, a realm of time that is 
always with John and is separate from the city’s dominating spatiality. Water and the 
beach is also the Lefebvrian sphere of freedom. Lefebvre tells us that the beach may be 
one of the last places left that is free from the constraints of spatial practice and 
representations of space, a place where the body is able to realize its full potential without 
being obstructed by the routine and dominating qualities of space as perceived and 
conceived: 
The beach is the only place of enjoyment that the human species has 
discovered in nature. Thanks to its sensory organs, from the sense of smell 
and from sexuality to sight (without any special emphasis being placed on 
the visual sphere), the body tends to behave as a differential field. It 
behaves, in other words, as a total body, breaking out of the temporal and 
spatial shell developed in response to labour, to the division of labour, to 
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the localizing of work and the specialization of places. In its tendency, the 
body asserts itself more (and better) as ‘subject’ and as ‘object’ than as 
‘subjectivity’ (in the classical philosophical sense) and as ‘objectivity’ 
(fragmented in every way, distorted by the visual, by images, etc.). (384) 
The beach, the ocean, water is a solace for the lived, time, and affect. On Dark City’s 
plane of immanence perceived and conceived space violently suppresses this realm of 
affect. Throughout nearly the entire film, these dominating spatial realms keep affect 
hidden, contained, and trapped in indoor pools, in bathtubs, in manufactured rivers and 
urban canals, on billboards and drawings, and in pipes and tunnels, conceived space 
ensconcing time. That is until John overthrows the Strangers at the end of the film, and in 
doing so this plane of immanence experiences a glorious rupture in its contradiction 
between time and space. In the film’s closing sequence, time, the virtual, affect, 
representational space overthrows spatial practice and representations of space. Some of 
the final images of the film are images of massive streams of never ending water bursting 
out of tunnels and pipes and pouring over the entire plane. Here, a giant body of water is 
now that which surrounds the ring-city and thus turns this dark metropolis into a brightly 
light island where representational space is omnipresent, time enveloping space. 
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Conclusion 
 Gilles Deleuze and Henri Lefebvre share a common admiration for water, the sea, 
the beach. They both see it as a place where time and movement are free from the 
constraints of space as perceived and conceived. Here, the body’s relationship to space is 
one of euphorically experiencing, living, and becoming in the world, or on the plane of 
immanence. Lefebvre shows that within this unique realm the body breaks away from the 
spheres of labour: “The beach is the only space of enjoyment that the human species has 
discovered in nature. Thanks to its sensory organs . . . the body tends to behave as 
differential field. It behaves, in other words, as a total body, breaking out of the temporal 
and spatial shell developed in response to labour…” (384). Deleuze echoes a similar line 
of thought, particularly with regards to the movement-image regime. Here, the 
philosopher contrasts the freedom of the sea against the constraints of land by 
understanding the sea as the ultimate figuration of movement, movement in-itself (C1 
77).59 This is a utopian space of “class solidarity,” free labour, and affect: “It is in this 
sense that occupations connected with the sea are not a relic or an insular type of folklore: 
they are the horizon of all occupations… (Deleuze, C1 78).60 Here movement is not 
governed by production or distribution and destinations, representations of space and 
                                                
59 Here, we can turn to Deleuze’s delineation of the French impressionist’s strong predilection of water: 
“Why does water seem to correspond to all the requirements of this French school: abstract aesthetic 
requirement, social documentary requirement, narrative dramatic requirement? It is firstly because water is 
the most perfect environment in which movement can be extracted from the thing moved, or mobility from 
movement itself” (C1 77). 
60 In a separate sentence Deleuze articulates the ways in which movement on water, or the “liquid abstract”, 
differs from movement on land in stating, “The drama was that it was necessary to break the links with the 
earth, of father with son, husband with wife and mistress, woman with lover, children with parents; to 
retreat into solitude to achieve human solidarity, class solidarity” (C1 78). 
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spatial practice. Instead, this is a plane of immanence in which the journey is separate 
from the destination, a plane of immanence in which becoming flourishes.61  
 In the time-image regime the sea plays a crucial role in figuring the fragmented 
world of the any-space-whatever. Here the body of the ship and the body of the sea 
coexists with each other as “the seed and the environment,” “the limpid and the opaque,” 
and “the actual and the virtual” (Deleuze, C2 71).62 The coexistence of these two 
heterogeneous bodies allows affect in its two poles of reflection and intensity to flourish. 
This is a plane of immanence in which bodies move through time, and not space. Here, it 
is the past that moves with and envelops the present; a ship perpetually moving through a 
sea of time.  
 With Lucien Castaing-Taylor and Verena Paravel’s 2012 film Leviathan, we have 
a third figuration of water that captures the function of this, once mysterious, realm in 
late capitalism. The documentary of a contemporary North American industrial fishing 
ship at sea turns the space of the sea into a dominating and ominous space. Here, it is no 
longer time, the past, the virtual, affect that the ship moves with. Rather, the sea has now 
become a realm of space as perceived and conceived. It is spatial practice and 
representations of space that moves with and swallows the ship on this homogeneous and 
contradictory plane of immanence. The ship has now been demoted to a searcher as its 
                                                
61 Deleuze differentiates the kind of movement that occurs on land from the kind of movement on water in 
stating, “And on land, movement always takes place from one point to another, always between two points, 
while on water the point is always between two movements: it thus marks the conversion or the inversion 
of movement, as in a hydraulic relationship of a dive and counter-dive, which is found in the movement of 
the camera itself (the final fall of the entwined bodies of the two lovers has no end, but is converted into an 
ascending movement)” (C1 79).  
62 These terms are the terms Deleuze uses to describe the coexistence of temporality within the crystalline 
structure of the time-image’s plane of immanence: “Exchange or indiscernibility thus follow each other in 
three ways in the crystalline circuit: the actual and the virtual (or the two mirrors face to face); the limpid 
and the opaque; the seed and the environment” (C2 71). 
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movements are determined by its destination, by production and distribution. This is, in 
other words, an intense pursuit for surplus-profit. 
  In its evolution from a temporal body to a spatial body the sea has become 
violent. On this spatial plane of immanence, the commercial ship does not glide 
effortlessly through the water. Rather, it battles the water. In this fight with space, the 
handheld camera cannot hold a stable frame. It repeatedly jerks horizontally across the 
formless frame, it shakes uncontrollably, it loses the ability to focus, muffles sound, and 
creates obscure and violent images. Throughout the film, the sea grabs the camera and 
pulls it down into its dark depths, and throws it back into the night sky where upon 
landing it then grabs it again and pulls it underwater, thus forcing the camera to lose its 
bearings. At different moments throughout the film, the sea flips the camera upside down, 
a phenomenon that creates an indiscernible mise-en-scène where the sky sinks to lower 
half of the frame while the sea hangs in the upper half. Both sky and sea are dark as ink. 
They swallow the commercial ship, as at one point in the film we get a horrific overhead 
long-shot of the ship’s deck ensconced by pure darkness. Furthermore, at multiple times 
throughout the film this omnipotent darkness, along with terrifying lines and obscure 
shapes of green, swallow the entire surface of screen itself, all homogeneity without 
hodological connections. 
  This is a schizophrenic spatiality, a plane of immanence in which spatial practice 
and representations of space attack time and becoming and create experiences of 
intensity.  Gone is the figuration of the sea as the realm of time, the virtual, affect. The 
temporal sea is extinct. It has been demoted to nostalgic relics that exist as tattoos on the 
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labourers arms and shoulders. Space has pulverized the temporal realm of affect into 
actions of pure intensity: Ferocious movements, violence, blood, and flesh. For hours on 
end the tired bodies on the ship yank and tug heavy chains, ropes, and nets out of the 
water, scavenger through shells and debris from the water, and monotonously slaughter, 
gut, decapitate, and butcher the creatures of the sea. In globalization, the sea is no longer 
different from the land. It has become an extension of spatial practice and representations 
of space. The only fragments that exist on the plane of immanence of late capitalism 
consist of space’s fragmentation of time itself.  
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